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FOREWORD 
This report was completed some time ago but for reasons beyond our control 
its publication has been delayed until now. The issue of the illegal movement 
of people retains its topicality and continues to be equally relevant as it was at 
the time of the project fieldwork. For example, recently, HEUNI has completed 
a further report on the FLEX project (Trafficking for Forced Labour and 
Labour Exploitation in Finland, Poland and Estonia, HEUNI Publication No. 
68), and the report on trafficking for sexual exploitation published by The 
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), accompanied by a Finnish 
country report published as HEUNI report No. 62 also indicate the importance 
of this area of research. 
The research reported on here was innovative as it included law enforcement 
practitioners and authority representatives in a constant dialogue with 
researchers. The aim was that this would allow for discussion of the data as it 
was gathered throughout the project. The intention was that data collection and 
interpretation formed a permanently iterative, self-correcting process and to 
some extent this was achieved. 
It was also an aim that the Expert Groups created for the project would 
continue once the research phase was completed in order to maximise the 
sharing of information and to sustain a dialogue between different professional 
groups. This aim proved to be over optimistic as there were too many problems 
caused by information sharing. It would seem that without external pressure 
and support, such formal cross-authority forms of co-operation do not survive 
spontaneously. The same could be observed in the context of the FLEX project. 
Our conclusion is that should such “horizontal” groups be created they will 
only continue if there is a budget and a responsible coordinating body 
established on a permanent basis. If not, the sustainability of such co-operative 
relationships is low. 
Our involvement in this topic brought us into contact with a multitude of 
experts, operational law enforcement personnel and policymakers who proved 
to be helpful in more ways than we could have hoped for or had a right to ask. 
These professionals have enriched our work and lives and on behalf of all 
colleagues involved, we wish to express our gratitude to all for the help and 
support we received. 
Helsinki & Manchester 18 April 2011 
Kauko Aromaa & Jon Spencer 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SOME 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Introduction 
The project reported here is a three-country project, Estonia, Finland and the 
UK. It is funded by the European Commission AGIS Programme, The 
Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security. It investigates the issues of 
corruption by organised crime in relation to border controls and immigration 
using as a case study the Finnish-Russian and the Estonian-Russian border. It 
also considers the methods of facilitation of people across borders, the role of 
crime groups and networks as well as organised crime and the relationship 
between illegal facilitation and exploitation in the labour market.  
The aim of the research was to investigate whether at border points there was 
evidence of corruption of officials in order to facilitate people across the border 
illegally. The issue of organised crime was identified as an important factor in 
understanding how people might be moved across borders illegally. If there 
was evidence of organised crime it would suggest that transnational networks 
between organised crime groups might exist and that there are strategic forms 
of communication between the organised crime groups in order to facilitate the 
maximisation of profit through the movement of people. If such an influence of 
organised crime in ‘immigration crime’ were to be discovered then it would 
indicate that EU borders are porous and therefore readily exploited by 
organised crime groups.  
In Finland, particular attention was given to the issues concerning the 
‘Development Plan of Border Guards’ and the planned cooperation in relation 
to Organised Crime and Combating Corruption. The contention was that the 
EU border with Russia is ‘weak’ and vulnerable to corruption at different 
levels: systemic, institutional and individual. Our argument was that corruption 
is used to maintain the flow of people across the border illegitimately by 
utilising existing legitimate channels. It was the Finnish view that organised 
crime groups used the Finnish – Russian and the Russian – Estonian borders to 
bring in illegal immigrants into the EU.  
Consequently the project was designed to take account of organised 
immigration crime and so was required to address the issue of human 
trafficking along with people smuggling and facilitation of people across 
borders. This raised a number of definitional issues and highlighted the varying 
perspectives between academic approaches to the problem and those of senior 
policy makers and operational staff. 
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Introducing the definitional issues 
The research had to engage with two definitional processes, one was that of 
corruption and the other was that of human trafficking and people smuggling. 
The definition of corruption that was agreed upon was the following: 
Corruption is defined as many kinds of “irregular” influence, the objective 
of which is to allow the participants to make profits they are not entitled 
to, the method being the breaking of internal or external rules.1 
This definition was utilised in the research because it considers the use of 
irregular influence on officials or those in positions of trust and authority; it 
was also agreed that the perpetrator of corruption should be motivated by 
profit, although that profit could be evidenced in a number of ways such as 
monetary gain or favours or influence. Finally, there has to be an element of 
rule transgression, either legal rules or internal organisational rules or 
professional codes of practice. 
In relation to the definition of human trafficking it was agreed that it was 
appropriate to use that of the United Nations as the EU primarily uses the 
definition of trafficking set out in the 2000 UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime which states; 
‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force of other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of other or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal 
of organs”2 
This definition prioritises the trafficking of women and children for sexual 
exploitation and highlights the three core elements of trafficking; “the 
movement or harbouring of a person; use of deception or coercion; and 
placement into situations of exploitation”3. The definition used in relation to 
human smuggling was that contained in The Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air4 and was the second of the protocols accepted 
                                                 
1 United Nations (2000) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime 
2 Home Office (2007a) ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’ p.14 
3 Home Office (2007b) ‘Trafficking for the Purposes of Labour Exploitation: A Literature 
Review’ p.2 
4 United Nations (2000) ibid 
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at Palermo in 2000. The Protocol states that smuggling or facilitation of people 
across borders is: 
“The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” 
These three definitions were utilised in the project in all three countries. 
Methodological issues 
A number of methodological difficulties have plagued attempts to research the 
illegal movement of people across borders, and have therefore affected the 
current level of understanding of the problem. 
Definitions 
Despite the UN definition of trafficking outlined above, the historic lack of a 
consensus on definitions of both trafficking and smuggling has caused 
problems for understanding the nature of trafficking and for the development 
of research methods. The problem with many of the definitions is that 
trafficking and smuggling are used interchangeably. So, it can be confusing 
when analysing data whether the respondent is talking about trafficking within 
the definition used within this project or whether they are discussing the 
smuggling of people. As Kelly has commented: 
“Assessing what data we do have is made more complex by the fact that 
governments, the media, and even researchers continue to conflate 
migration, asylum, refugees, trafficking, and smuggling. Indeed it may 
prove impossible to resolve this conceptual confusion, since in some 
instances it serves political and ideological ends.” (Kelly 2005) 
So, problems of definition are not just about a failure to agree or a poor use of 
language but may have ideological and institutional interests to serve. In 
addition, continuing disagreement regarding the applicability of the definitions 
has meant that this problem has not been solved. The main barrier for research 
is the lack of consistency in the way that trafficking and smuggling have been 
applied and which blurs distinctions for estimating the extent of trafficking. 
Whilst the UN definition provides a platform for consistent research and data 
collection, more improvement is needed to capture an accurate reflection of 
trafficking in human beings. The approach of the research team was to apply 
the UN definitions from the Palermo Protocol where possible. However, 
considerable scepticism was retained during the life of the project in relation to 
how migrants were being socially constructed. 
10 
Data collection 
Despite migration becoming more important on domestic and international 
agendas, very few countries collect comprehensive and specific data on 
undocumented migration and human trafficking. In many cases, criminal 
offences for trafficking in human beings were only created in the last few years 
so data is difficult to source. Again, the issues of definitions are relevant as the 
way that trafficking is constructed may vary making any available data 
incomparable. Finally, as both human trafficking and moving people illegally 
across borders are clandestine activities, the only illegal migration and 
trafficking which is captured in data is that which is discovered and it is not 
known how generalisable this data is to the undetected instances. The 
collection of data currently underway as a result of the development of 
technology such as the Schengen Information System and other international 
migration databases may provide the opportunities for more reliable research 
into trafficking but this is yet to be evidenced. 
Estimating the scale of the problem 
The inability to accurately estimate the scale of illegal movement of people 
across borders and trafficking in human beings is linked to the obstacles of 
definitions and lack of data. The IOM estimates that there are roughly 20 to 30 
million unauthorised migrants worldwide5. However, deciding whether the 
experiences of an individual are defined as smuggling or trafficking has a huge 
impact on estimating the size of the problem. Figures that are collected often 
refer to illegal migration, rather than trafficking and it is difficult to assess the 
proportion subject to trafficking. Most estimates are based on official figures 
from criminal justice or immigration authorities, which only include detected 
instances of human trafficking. It is thought that, at the most, only one in three 
illegal migrants are caught6 making any estimate an under representation. 
Finally, the presentation of figures is not often accompanied by an explanation 
of the methods used to reach that figure. As a result, it is difficult for the results 
to be judged or replicated. 
Accessing migrants (trafficked and undocumented) 
Most victims of human trafficking and those who migrate illegally rarely come 
into contact with official organisations or NGOs. As a hidden population, they 
are very difficult to access for research purposes. One consequence of this is 
that there is a dearth of good quality research that provides the migrant with a 
voice and so the accounts we have tend to be anecdotal. As there are few 
accounts of the migrants there is also no reliable research on the traffickers and 
                                                 
5 www.iom.int 
6 Salt, J. (2000) ‘Trafficking and Human Smuggling: A European Perspective’ (2000) 
International Migration, p.40 
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organisers of migration crime. Those migrants that are discovered and who 
have been trafficked have been through an extremely traumatic experience and 
this raises serious ethical issues in their taking part in research. In addition, it is 
not known how the experiences of those discovered compares to the hidden 
population and so much of the current research cannot be generalised. Due to 
the access problems, samples are frequently small and therefore the 
generalisability of the research is limited.  
In addition to the difficulties accessing victims causing problems for research 
methodologies, it also impacts on law enforcement approaches. The 
vulnerability and distress suffered by victims of trafficking and the lack of 
knowledge of the people involved in their movement and exploitation limits 
the use for witness testimony. The EU has acknowledged this problem and 
further provisions have been extended to victims of trafficking to assist them as 
vulnerable witnesses. However, the focus on prosecution has been criticised for 
failing to meet the needs of victims other than for the duration of criminal 
proceedings7. 
                                                 
7 Goodey, J. (2003) ‘Migration, crime and victimhood’ Punishment and Society, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
p.423-4 
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CHAPTER 2: PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
Project methods  
All three participating countries have carried out their own individual research 
following the framework jointly developed by the research team. The first 
version of the joint research report was made available in the three countries 
expert group meeting in January 2006 in Tallinn. 
The project was constructed in two distinct parts. The first part of the project 
was to investigate what was known about how migrants moved illegally across 
borders and whether border crossing points were vulnerable to corruption. In 
order to gather this data the following methods were employed; 
 Qualitative Data gathered from: 
o Law Enforcement officials 
o Government policy makers 
o Border Officials 
 Participant Observation at Border Crossing points 
o Undertaken with UK Immigration Officers at the UK – French 
Border Calais, France 
 Country based Local Area Network Research group  
These groups comprised law enforcement officials from the key law 
enforcement agencies. The idea of the network groups was to 
establish a forum where the research group could interact with the 
operational law enforcement officers who could be an interactive part 
of the research process. 
 Project Network Research Group 
This group brought together members of the Local Network Groups 
to discuss the country findings and to consider the indicative findings 
from the research and to plan for the second phase of the project.  
The data gathered from officials was completed in the first part of the project 
and was undertaken using a qualitative semi-structured interview schedule (see 
Appendix 1). Respondents were identified using official agencies as an 
indicator of those agencies that had responsibility for immigration issues. 
These agencies varied from country to country in the project but there were no 
significant problems for the research group to identify and contact each of the 
relevant agencies. The participant observation was undertaken in the UK only 
as there was no direct border crossing with a non-EU member state and so it 
was decided that data could be gathered by observing the process of how 
borders are secured on a day by day level. This proved to be non-problematic 
to organise. 
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The Country Based Project Network Groups were established to provide a two-
way flow of information. It was agreed within the research group that the 
project would benefit from having an applied approach. It was considered that 
this would make engagement in the project more relevant to busy officials and 
would be a process whereby the project would be giving something back to law 
enforcement agencies. It was also considered that these groups would provide 
up to the minute situation reports in relation to immigration and human 
trafficking. These groups met frequently, with the UK and Finnish groups 
being more successful in terms of meeting and engagement. The Estonian 
group proved difficult to establish partly due to the commitments of law 
enforcement officials and their need to use the resource of time carefully and 
perhaps also some suspicion of the research. However, in all countries these 
groups were difficult to sustain over the life of the project, this may in part 
have been to do with project organisation but also with the continually 
changing personnel and organisational structures. 
The Project Network Group met at the halfway point of the project in Tallinn, 
Estonia. This proved to be a useful meeting in bringing together law 
enforcement personnel from different countries. The agenda and schedule of 
the meeting is contained in Appendix 2. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLORING THE APPROACH 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE 
MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ACROSS 
BORDERS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Introduction 
As EU states, Estonia, Finland and the UK are affected to changes of EU law 
and policy in addition to domestic legislation. Historically, issues of trafficking 
have been relevant to EU policy since 19948. In recent years, the Schengen 
Agreement and the Dublin and TREVI groups have instigated major changes. 
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime has influenced 
and shaped EU policy. 
The Schengen Agreement was initially signed in 1985 by the Benelux 
Economic Union and was expanded to include 13 countries in 1997. The main 
themes of the Agreement are to abolish internal border controls, develop 
common asylum policy and to facilitate the collection and exchange of 
information initially via the Schengen Information Systems (SIS). The UK has 
opted out of the Schengen Agreement in order to maintain internal border 
checks whereas Estonia and Finland have fully incorporated the Schengen 
Agreement. Although the Schengen Agreement has ostensibly removed 
internal borders for signatory countries, the visa application processes 
contained therein can be seen to control the borders at a distance as migrants 
are not permitted to leave their country of origin until they have successfully 
applied. 
In 1999 The EU Justice and Home Affairs Summit (Tampere) brought human 
trafficking clearly into the auspices of organised crime and highlighted 
trafficking in human beings, especially women, as a priority for law 
enforcement personnel9. This theme was continued with the creation of the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Crime 2000 including the optional Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children. The approach of the UK has seen human trafficking increasingly 
addressed from the perspective of organised crime with human trafficking 
coming under the auspices of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
The Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human 
Beings is mainly concerned with the provision of assistance and protection for 
                                                 
8 For a comprehensive review of the historical development of relevant EU legislation see 
Skrivankova, 2007 
9 Green, P. and Grewcock, M. (2003) ‘The War Against Illegal Immigration’ Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 14, No. 1, p.92 
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victims of human trafficking. The STOP and DAPHNE programmes, both EU 
initiatives, have worked with victims of sex trafficking, primarily women and 
children, through provision of victim assistance, education, awareness raising 
campaigns and the improvement of information exchange between member 
states.  
Movement of people within the EU  
The nature of the movement of people in the EU differs from the movement 
within countries due to the objectives and consequent policies that have 
worked towards creating an open migratory space inside the EU with 
geographically diverse external borders. Five major patterns of movement have 
been identified within the EU10; 
 Through Russia, the Baltic and Poland 
 Ukraine, the Balkans and the Czech and Slovac Republics 
 Bulgaria, Romania and the Balkans 
 Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean 
 North Africa and the Mediterranean 
The basic philosophy of planning travel routes is simple. Typically, people try 
to travel as rapidly and cheaply as possible from point A to point B. It is 
normal that problems occur during the travel, such as: betrayals, false 
promises, or the need to mislead authorities. Due to such reasons, the travel 
routes are in practice complicated, expensive and time-consuming. Thus, the 
travel takes persons slowly and expensively from point A to point C. Point C 
can resemble the originally intended destination point B, but it may also be a 
large distance from B. The person(s) who ended up at point C can abide with 
the situation or try to make new contacts and earn more money to continue his 
or her travel to the originally intended destination point B. In practice, a person 
who pays his or her journey from China to the USA may end up in Russia, the 
Schengen area or North America, depending on the quality and reliability of 
the services he or she has bought, and on his or her personal good or bad luck. 
Once the person has paid those who organise the smuggling, he or she has no 
kind of guarantee, and no legal protection or complaining body to protect them, 
if the smugglers decide to deceive, abandon or even kill the person during the 
travel. The more misfortune the smugglers face from the side of the authorities, 
the more certain it is that they change routes or destination country. 
Smuggling of human beings is common and the variety of routes is impossible 
to count. For example, one of the main routes from China is to use a direct 
flight from China to Helsinki. In some cases, the smuggled persons have used 
Moscow as an intermediate stopping point, as the Bangladeshi people have 
done. Moscow is an intermediate stopping point for many Africans who have 
                                                 
10 Salt, J. and Stein, J. (1997) ‘Migration as Business’ International Journal of Migration, Vol. 
35, No. 4, p.474 
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direct flights to there from their home country. A journey that has started from 
India may go via South America to Paris and from there to Helsinki on the way 
to North America. Finland is a good bridgehead on the way to the Schengen 
area. Once the persons are in Finland and the Schengen area, the next 
destination of the persons is usually: Sweden, other Nordic countries, 
Germany, France and Spain. The most attractive destination to travellers to 
North America is USA and in Europe it is Great Britain. In the USA and the 
U.K., there are so many countrymen and relatives who share the same 
language, and can help in the beginning by hiding and guiding newcomers.  
The individual country reports contain further detail of the patterns of 
movement within Estonia, Finland and the UK and the role of the country as a 
source, transit or destination country. 
Market structures 
Many commentators have discussed the advantages of viewing the trafficking 
of human beings as a market as a way of describing the structures that both 
make up and support the activity11. The illicit and clandestine nature of 
trafficking influences the way in which the market is structured. A loose and 
flexible structure involving individuals with little knowledge of each other 
allows traffickers to reorganise their activities in response to changing law 
enforcement strategy and ensures little infiltration should part of the 
operational structure be detected. The flexibility of trafficking operations is 
often cited as evidence of the involvement of organised crime groups12. The 
characteristics of the market for trafficking for sexual exploitation results in a 
network of isolated clusters linked together by infrequent contact, resulting in a 
low cohesion, low density network structure13. 
Both legitimate and illegitimate markets can be seen to support trafficking by 
maintaining the demand for the services. This ranges from the supply of 
trafficked persons into the commercial and domestic industries (including 
restaurants, the building trade and agriculture) to the demand for trafficked 
persons to work in illicit and criminal sectors of the economy, the sex industry 
being most prominently reported. Trafficking may also be supported by the 
increasingly restrictive border control policies operating in many countries. As 
legal entry and asylum become more difficult to accomplish, the opportunities 
for traffickers to take advantage of vulnerable groups increase. 
                                                 
11 Aronowitz (2001); Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) 
12 Aronowitz (2001) ‘Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings’, European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, p.176 
13 Bruinsma, G. and Bernasco, W. (2004) ‘Criminal groups and transnational illegal markets’ 
Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 41, p.88-9 
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Organised crime 
Features of the trafficking process suggest a close involvement with crime 
groups; the use of forged documents, large numbers of people being moved 
and the flexibility to vary the routes used. The extent of organisation in the 
trafficking of human beings can be categorised into 3 types; 
 Small, local networks which are involved in moving smaller numbers 
of people across shorter distances with more short term involvement 
 A set of small groups loosely connected which are responsible for 
providing small parts of larger, more complex movements and 
exploitation 
 Organisations that are capable of transporting larger numbers of 
people over long distances and may also be involved in the ongoing 
exploitation of trafficked persons 
It has been suggested that the opening of the Eastern borders has increased the 
opportunities for involvement of Ukrainian, Russian and Georgian organised 
crime groups14. However, there is a lack of reliable data to support these 
links15. In addition, to what extent this level of practical organisation and 
communication can be defined as ‘organised crime’ is debatable. However, the 
locating of trafficking in EU policy and legislation has seen the problem 
increasingly defined as one of ‘organised crime’ and therefore this has become 
the focus of much of the anti-trafficking strategy in individual countries. 
It is important to distinguish between illegal border crossings and organised 
crime groups. Discussions repeatedly point to the importance of social 
networks (the presence of family or community in the country of destination) 
in the decision to migrate. Assistance to make the illegal border crossing may 
also be provided by those already in the country of destination. Subsequent 
exploitation by traffickers may alter the classification of such people although 
their initial arrival was facilitated by other means. 
International co-operation 
As a global phenomenon, one of the key recommendations in attempts to 
address human trafficking is increased international co-operation. A lack of co-
operation either between agencies within a country or between countries 
presents more opportunities for traffickers to utilise inconsistencies and 
loopholes created as a result of the inconsistencies. Improving international co-
operation covers a wide range of activities including, but not exhaustively, the 
                                                 
14 Smartt, U. (2003) ‘Human Trafficking : Simply a European Problem?’ European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Justice Vol.11, No. 2, p.170 
15 Salt, J. (2000) ‘Trafficking and Human Smuggling: A European Perspective’ International 
Migration, Special Issue, p.44 
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exchange of information, co-ordinating law enforcement approaches and 
policies and provisions available to victims of trafficking16. 
The UN Trafficking Protocol requires states to co-operate to provide measures 
to “alleviate factors such as poverty, low economic development and lack of 
equal opportunities”17. There is also heavy emphasis on Europol to enable 
organisation and co-operation between member states in relation to the 
investigation of trafficking incidences, particularly through the encouragement 
and facilitation of partnerships18. The development of FRONTEX specifically 
aims to improve co-operation in relation to border controls within the EU 
concentrating on integrating EU border management polices, border security 
strategies and an EU integrated border management system. 
Corruption 
It is widely understood that corruption has a significant role in facilitating the 
trafficking of human beings19. Corruption can occur in a range of ways from 
“active involvement in corrupt practices, to negligent or passive acts that allow 
corruption to happen”20. The classic definition, followed by the World Bank 
and Transparency International, views corruption as the use of one's public 
position for illegitimate private gain. Abuse of power and personal gain, 
however, can occur in both the public and private domains and often in 
collusion with individuals from both sectors. 
The research undertaken in this project indicated that the extent of corruption 
was not systematic or endemic but there were instances of low level corruption. 
Low level corruption has been categorised into the following typologies: 
 Border-Guard Corruption: Widespread and (inter-)national. The 
example of the border-guard who is willing to ‘turn a blind-eye’ to a 
forged document in return for a one-off monetary gain.  
 Visa Officials: It is argued that border corruption is more than just 
front-line corruption; border control corruption also applies to the 
embassy-based Visa Officer who is willing to fraudulently supply a 
visa. In such an instance, the ‘official at the gate’ would be by-passed 
altogether; the corruption/ deception would have already taken place. 
Essentially, the person arrives at the border with genuine documents 
                                                 
16 Aronowitz, A. (2001) ‘Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings’ European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, p.190 
17 Goodey, J. (2003) ‘Migration, crime and victimhood’ Punishment and Society, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
p.423 
18 Mameli, P. (2002) ‘Stopping the Illegal Trafficking of Human Beings’ Crime, Law and 
Social Change, Vol. 38, p.74 
19 Zhang, S. and Pineda, S. (2008) ‘Corruption as a Causal Factor in Human Trafficking’ 
20 Richards, K. (2004) ‘The Trafficking of Migrant Workers’ International Migration Vol. 42, 
No.5, p.158 
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(NB: they may have been gained using deception/ under corrupt 
circumstances) and is henceforth ‘free to pass go’. 
 Deception: ‘Impostors’ Cases of Russians posing as EU member state 
nationals, for example, as Lithuanians, for whom they fit the profile 
very easily and fraudulently applying for a Schengen visa to enable 
free movement around Europe. Illegal immigrants also use lost or 
stolen passports to travel, deceptively taking on the identity of the 
passport holder. In such instances, the passport has a short life and the 
window for opportunity tends to be within a month or so.  
 Disappearance: Quasi-Legitimate Migration Facilitating Illegal 
Immigration. A visa for entry into a country is legitimately granted, 
border control legally stamps you in, and then you disappear or pick 
up a new identity using fraudulent documents. It is a very cheap and 
safe way to illegally migrate, remaining very appealing and 
convenient; the risks are low, the losses are low, but the gain is 
arguably high – you are free to work, become part of a community, 
and could eventually attempt to claim asylum. 
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CHAPTER 4: ESTONIA 
Movement of people within Estonia 
Estonia, one of the three Baltic States, regained its independence in 1991 after 
the period of Soviet occupation had lasted for fifty years. Since regaining 
control, the people of Estonia have made strenuous efforts to rebuild their 
democratic institutions and a free market economy. In May 2004, Estonia 
became a member of the European Union. In December 2007, Estonia became 
a part of the Schengen Area, the European border control-free territory.  
According to the results of the last 2000 Population Census, the population has 
decreased 14% compared to the 1989 census data. However, the proportion of 
Estonian nationals has increased from 61% in 1989 to 69% in 2008. The 
reasons for this development are twofold. First, a considerable number of 
Russian citizens have left Estonia since the re-establishment of independence. 
In 2008, 26% of the population was Russian. The high proportion of Russian 
people is the result of several large waves of immigration during the 50 years 
of the Soviet regime. 
After regaining independence in 1991 Estonia adopted very strict citizenship 
policies. Only pre-annexation Estonian citizens and their offspring were 
acknowledged as legitimate Estonian citizens. All others (mostly those whose 
native language was Russian) were obliged to either apply for Estonian 
citizenship by naturalization or apply for residence permit. To apply for 
Estonian citizenship by naturalization, a person is required to pass an Estonian 
language exam – a procedure not everyone was able or willing to complete. 
Those who were neither eligible for automatic Estonian citizenship nor gained 
it through naturalization had an option to gain citizenship of the Russian 
Federation. A large proportion of the Russian speaking population followed 
this route. However, some did not want Russian citizenship, these people were 
given status of “non-citizens” or “aliens”. Problems associated with a 
significant part of the population having ‘alien’ status still exist today. 
Experts have raised concerns that the recent memberships of the EU and the 
Schengen area will cause problems for Estonia due to the increased flexibility 
of border controls. However, there is no pre and post data available for 
comparison to test these concerns. 
Availability of data 
The data was collected from different sources. The main empirical material 
came from interviews with experts who deal with illegal immigration issues in 
their everyday life. This included experts from Department of Migration, the 
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Centre for Illegal Immigrants, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Social 
Affairs, Ministry of Interior, police representatives, prosecutors, border guards 
and customs. In total, 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted between 
October 2005 and January 2006. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
analysed using Atlas.ti software. Material was also obtained from records of 
court proceedings in cases of trafficking and corruption of officials. 
Additionally, media reports on illegal immigration, trafficking and related 
corruption cases were examined. The analysis presented in this chapter is based 
on all these sources. 
Regular statistical data on migration – legal as well as estimations of illegal 
migration in Estonia – is unavailable. Researchers find that this situation 
restricts the scope of migration studies in Estonia. The situation with statistical 
data was somewhat improved in 2008, when The Immigrant Population Survey 
was conducted. This survey revealed that the number of immigrants who have 
entered and are currently residing in Estonia since 1992 (so called recent 
immigrants) is about 6,600.  
Both legal and illegal migration can be characterised by a pattern of 
considerable outflow from Estonia with just a small number of people arriving 
The number of illegal immigrants is difficult to estimate, not only for 
researchers but also for the experts working on this field: 
Probably this exact number, how much illegal migrants there are, I think, 
in Estonian Republic, I think nobody knows. I think so and it is not 
possible, because it is such latent theme, it is not possible to define with 
hundred percent precision. (Int 17) 
However, all respondents participating in the study agreed that the number of 
illegal immigrants arriving to Estonia is small:  
I only have heard of few….few illegal migrants like those, for example, 
who later claim for asylum. There have been only 19 cases, so we cannot 
really speak about high numbers of illegal migrants moving to Estonia or 
happening in Estonia. (Int 2) 
How much of them there have been… over a hundred, some 105-110 
asylum seekers in total in Estonia. 60 of them have been in our centre . Of 
them four have got refugee status. (int 6) 
In their everyday work, experts encountered different kinds of illegal 
movement of people. The main pattern of illegal movement in Estonia is 
trafficking in human beings, mainly related to trafficking in women for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation. In the cases of trafficking Estonia, as a rule, is a 
source country. The destination countries for trafficking in women usually 
include nearby countries: Finland, Sweden and increasingly Norway. Among 
the other countries the interviewees mentioned Japan, Germany, Great Britain, 
Ireland and The Netherlands as destination countries. The purpose of 
trafficking out of Estonia is generally to supply sex industries, mostly strip 
clubs and brothels. There were few cases when women from other countries 
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(Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova) were trafficked to Estonia with the purpose to 
engage in prostitution.  
Other illegal immigration cases were few and related to human smuggling and 
illegal crossing of borders. Another significant group of illegal immigrants are 
those individuals referred to above who have become illegal due to the change 
in the political situation in Estonia. 
Border controls and patterns and ways of moving 
(illegal) persons 
As outlined above, Estonia plays a significant role as a source and transit 
country while remaining rather unattractive as a destination country. The main 
reasons for this are lower economic development compared to older European 
countries such as Finland, Sweden or UK and very low level of social benefits 
provided by the state to unemployed persons or refugees. Estonia as a 
destination country is attractive to migrants from CIS countries – Russia, 
Byelorussia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Experts referred to pull factors including 
the ability to secure short term employment; Russian is widely spoken in 
Estonia and increased living standards. 
Estonia is more frequently a transit and source country. The main transport into 
Estonia is coach and out, towards Scandinavia is ferry. The following routes 
were discussed; 
 From Russia to Scandinavia via Estonia. Immigrants from CIS 
countries cross borders with legal documents although they do not 
have permits to work or for long term residence and so are issued 
with false documents. 
 From Turkey/Iraq to Scandinavia via Estonia. Borders on this route 
are crossed with forged documents; immigrants that are stopped by 
authorities apply for asylum. 
 From Estonia to Finland/Sweden/Norway/UK/Ireland. The borders 
are crossed legally due to membership of the EU.  
Several patterns were described by our experts regarding fraudulent 
documents. The most common fraudulent documents referred to were 
Lithuanian passports or driving licences. This does not mean, however, that 
these cases always involved Lithuanian citizens as Lithuanian documentation is 
notoriously easy to counterfeit. Experts mentioned that several counterfeiting 
'factories' had been discovered a few years previously 
There were also instances where stolen or 'borrowed', valid passports or ID 
cards are used. When the person producing the photograph resembles a person 
with similar face shape, hair colour and other similar features, it would be very 
difficult for a border guard to spot the difference. It is especially true with 
people of other races, as they look very alike to an Estonian. 
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Experts agreed that to obtain forged passports or false identities, a relation to 
criminal networks is needed. Discussing the existence of criminal groups, 
experts concluded that criminal organisations are involved in these activities 
but not as main organisers but rather as a service providers or links in the chain 
that brings a person from one country to another. No corruption was mentioned 
in regards of forging passports or ID cards. 
Corruption 
As above, in the majority of cases people cross the border with legal 
documents, having obtained a tourist visa to enter Estonia. To obtain a visa, a 
person needs an invitation from Estonian resident or legal body. Experts noted 
that there is no problem for persons from CIS countries to get such an 
invitation, because many of them have relatives or acquaintances living in 
Estonia. A person becomes an illegal immigrant when he/she remains in 
Estonia after the visa expires.  
Interviews revealed an instance of corruption related to the visa application 
process. Police stopped a person with tourist visa who had not left Estonia in 
due time, while there was a police database entry indicating that this person has 
already left the country. When police asked border guard to clarify on it, the 
record disappeared. 
Interviews did not reveal extensive information relating to cases of corruption 
although it was not suggested that there is no corruption related to migration 
and border control. The general consensus was that corruption exists, but 
experts did not personally know anybody involved. Experts referred to cases of 
corruption that occurred several years ago or had occurred in other 
departments; 
It is clear that customs and border are the most vulnerable places for 
corruption and this was confirmed in practice. (Int 9) 
There are a few court cases dealing with corruption of border guards or custom 
officials as follows; 
 In 2003 a border guard at Luhamaa border control point took a bribe 
for letting a person to smuggle goods over the border.  
 In 2005 a border guard allowed a person to bring three grenades over 
the border. In exchange he received a bribe. The same year another 
border guard officer was found guilty for receiving a bribe in 
exchange for a letting vehicle through to carry smuggled cigarettes.  
 The biggest corruption case in 2005 was also related to borders. For a 
fee (5-50 EUR) customs officers from Luhamaa cordon allowed 
trucks to cross Estonian-Russian border without checks. This 
corruption scheme was working for at least half a year and nearly all 
personnel was involved. When the case became known, the personnel 
of Luhamaa cordon was replaced. 
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 In 2007 a border guard was found guilty of providing interested 
persons with information on border guard officers’ names, working 
hours and exact border segments where they are on watch. 
Therefore, there are vulnerabilities for corruption in regard to moving people 
across the Estonian border. All of these situations can be easily used to move 
people illegally. For example, trucks that pass the border without checks can 
easily bring not only undeclared goods but also illegal immigrants or victims of 
human trafficking. The latter described case suggests that the so called “green 
border” is vulnerable to be crossed illegally and that some officers would allow 
such border crossings to happen.  
One can distinguish between so called “soft” and “hard” measures used to deal 
with corruption. While the former are aimed at prevention of the possibilities 
of corruption the latter are concerned with punishment of corruption offences. 
At the same time with the interviews for the current project, there was an Anti 
Corruption Strategy in place. The “Honest State” strategy proposed a number 
of specific steps aimed at reducing the risk of corruption in Estonia. It proposed 
several measures to prevent corruption as well as outlining proceedings 
regarding corruption offences. The main focus of the strategy was local 
governments and local authorities. The strategy recognised that previous 
government anti-corruption activities were directed to reduce corruption among 
state authorities:  
“The fight against corruption has been conducted systematically and 
effectively in state authorities where the risk of corruption is the greatest, 
primarily the police and the customs authorities. The reduction in the risk 
of corruption has been facilitated by the introduction of strict controls and 
the reorganisation of certain procedures, such as the ending of cash 
transactions.” 
It was recognised that “the level of corruption in Estonia is lower than in most 
of the other EU Accession Countries. On the other hand, the level of corruption 
in Estonia is significantly higher than the average level in the current EU 
Member States” 
One of the possibilities to reduce opportunities for corruption is rotation of the 
personnel. It is used now by both border guards and customs.  
Border guards have this nuance that border guards rotate, they are not 
very long in one place, so there will not be just one official at the place for 
you, who it is worth bribing. So you need to approach them case by case 
and then the possibility is high that he has just arrived there and he will 
not go with you, he will just turn you in. But customs officers – now they 
are not any more, they are also rotating – previously they have been 
always at one place for years and all their faces were already known so 
there was no problem to become friends and to ask him for a favour. (Int 
20) 
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Another effective measure according to our experts is strict control over the 
officials. There is an internal control service at the Border Guard and Customs 
departments. Additionally, the security police (KAPO) also has the right to 
deal with corruption cases. For a corrupt official the risk of being caught is 
relatively high.  
Border guards… of course if they would like to take money… but the risk 
is high, there are customs, tax board internal control or investigation 
department and plus KAPO. (Int 18)  
Exploitation 
Since the early 2000s, the issue of Trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation has received considerable attention. Important roles here are 
played by awareness raising campaigns first organised by international 
organisations such as the Nordic Council of Ministers or the International 
Organisation of Migration. This process has resulted in the adoption of an 
Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in 2005. To understand 
the problems related to definitions relating to trafficking one should look at 
least briefly at the Estonian legislation on trafficking. 
Estonia has joined a number of declarations and international legal acts, 
whereby it has assumed the obligation to combat trafficking in persons in its 
different forms and hypostases. The Penal Code of Estonia lacks a specific 
offence where trafficking in persons is a crime. Therefore the actual cases of 
trafficking in persons can be defined, under Estonian laws, by means of other 
offences. The most important ones in regard to THB are: enslaving (§ 133) and 
abduction (§ 134). 
'Enslaving' is defined as “placing a human being in a situation where he or she 
is forced to work or perform other duties against his or her will for the benefit 
of another person, or keeping a person in such a situation, if such an act is 
performed through violence or deceit or by taking advantage of the helpless 
situation of the person”. Enslaving is one of the most important corpuses delicti 
of the Penal Code, by means of which offenders can be brought to criminal 
justice for trafficking in persons in Estonia. However, problems arise due to 
definitions of working "against his own free will” and "to the benefit of 
another”. Working against one’s own free will presuppose absolute coercion, 
which is a very rare occurrence in actual cases of trafficking in persons. More 
prevalent is the transition from easier forms of exploitation to graver ones (e.g. 
from striptease, to making a pornographic work, to paid sexual relations), 
where the victim has given her consent to partake in easier forms but 
withdraws that consent at a later date. The sexual exploitation of women is 
normally carried out when the person is paid a certain fee. However, that fee is 
significantly lower than that which is paid to third parties. Conceivably, it is 
due to the failure to formally comply with such conditions that the courts have 
had difficulties convicting people using this definition of enslavement. The 
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main difference between enslavement and trafficking in persons evidently lies 
in the fact that the person will no longer be placed in the “state of the classical 
slave”, rather she would be placed in the states being "like enslavement”. Such 
an approach is, among others emphasised by the UNO trafficking-in-persons 
definition.  
In the first version of this paragraph enslavement was defined as forcing a 
person to work “through violence or deceit”. The enslaving paragraph was 
amended in 2007 according to article 1 p. EU Council Framework Decision of 
19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings (2002/629/JHA). In 
addition to use of violence to gain control over the person, “an abuse of 
authority or of a position of vulnerability", which is such that the person has no 
real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved” is also 
considered enslavement. 
'Abduction' is defined as “taking or leaving a person, through violence or 
deceit, in a state where it is possible to persecute or humiliate him or her on 
grounds of race or gender or for other reasons, and where he or she lacks legal 
protection against such treatment and does not have the possibility to leave the 
state”. The goal of the corpus delicti is to provide further protection against 
being subject to enslavement or discrimination. It provides a framework of 
punishment for the seemingly regular act preceding the enslavement (in case of 
taking a person to another country). Commentaries to Penal Code specify: “as a 
rule, it is the connection of the first links in the chain of trafficking in persons 
(the fraudulent travelling agents, the recruiting agents etc) with the actual 
violation of personal freedom (forced marriage, prostitution etc) which is 
especially hard to prove”. 
An important change to Estonian legislation is the amendment of the Aliens 
Act which prescribes the possibility of issuing temporary residence permits to 
trafficking victims that entered into force on 1 February 2007. 
Most often, women are trafficked from Estonia for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation. Studies reveal that women have often been already involved in 
prostitution prior to moving abroad. Women consent to be engaged in 
prostitution, and physical violence is rarely used by traffickers, especially 
during the recruitment phase. This issue of voluntary participation in the 
provision of sex services raises the question whether or not such women can be 
considered victims of trafficking. Experts interviewed for the current study 
often demonstrated that although they  are aware of the issue of trafficking, in 
their opinion a prostitute cannot be seen as a victim of exploitation. 
Because these persons go voluntarily and do a job there, then we cannot 
talk about human trafficking here. As we know, in European states and in 
legally developed countries prostitution is legalised. We should look in 
this context that people come and do this job voluntarily, in this context 
we cannot consider it a trafficking case.(Int.1) 
Cases haven been reported involving people from Estonia looking for 
employment abroad, who consequently become victims of fraud and labour 
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exploitation. Interestingly, while cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation 
come to the attention of police – usually when a brothel is discovered or a pimp 
arrested – cases of labour exploitation will not be reported. People who go 
abroad and become victims of fraud, exploitation, sometimes even violence, 
usually think that this is their own fault; they took a risk and lost.  
An acquaintance of mine went to Spain with the assistance of one firm 
from Tallinn, to collect oranges. She told me that she went to Tallinn for a 
consultation and everything seemed very trustworthy…She paid about 
10,000 EEK (equal to more than 600 EUR -A.M.) and for this money she 
was taken to Spain. Lithuanians met this woman at the airport, collected 
her passport and drove her to a farm and ordered her to work. Every 
evening…a group of Lithuanians come to collect the day’s earnings. When 
one lady opposed, she was beaten…Because the acquaintance of mine 
spoke some Spanish and her daughter was living in Spain, she was lucky 
to get out of there…But she did not go to the police. (Int 7)  
Official approaches 
At the time of the field work, Estonia had just joined the EU but was still not a 
member of the Schengen agreement. After accession to the EU, border 
regulation has changed dramatically. Checks of EU citizens’ documents have 
become more relaxed and border guards no longer enter border crossing 
information into a database. Such procedures are only necessary for non-EU 
citizens. Experts agreed that these rules were favourable for tourism but found 
that as a result the vulnerability of borders increased. The main concern, 
however, was in relation to Estonia joining the Schengen area (21/12/2007). 
Experts recognised the benefits of being part of Schengen but at the same time 
highlighted the risks.  
The benefits of joining the Schengen area are unified operational standards, a 
unified monitoring system to track the movement of persons around Europe 
and institutionalised co-operation amongst authorities in the EU. Sharing 
common information systems will help and will have a positive impact on 
illegal immigration from countries outside Schengen. Amongst negative 
impacts of Schengen is that the security of Schengen depends on the level of 
border security. It is only as strong as the weakest link: it doesn’t matter if 90% 
of countries take good care of their borders if 10% do not.  
Joining the Schengen agreement could make Estonia more attractive as a 
transit country for illegal immigrants. This expectation has, to some extent, 
become reality: the number of asylum seekers has grown remarkably since 
Estonia joined the Schengen area. Up to 2007, the total number of asylum 
seekers in Estonia was around 10; during 2007-2008 the number of asylum 
seekers grew to 14, while 40 persons applied for asylum in 2009. As the 
Estonian-Russian border becomes an outer border of the EU, it is important 
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how secure it is. In general, experts found that there are no problems, as 
Russian authorities have good control of their own borders.  
Considering the future, cooperation is an important aspect; co-operation 
between different agencies within Estonia; formal co-operation between 
countries (e.g. liaison officers, framework agreements, bilateral agreements) 
and informal co-operation between authorities from different countries. 
This co-operation indeed is very important. Formally because by this we 
can get all necessary documents to proceed to the court and informally 
because we can do our job faster and therefore can plan our work 
accordingly (Int 15).  
 29
CHAPTER 5: FINLAND 
Introduction and movement of people within Finland 
The Republic of Finland has a surface of 337,000 square kilometres. It 
neighbours to Sweden and Norway in the west, the Russian Federation in the 
east and Estonia in the south (only with sea border). The land border with 
Russia is about 1,000 kilometres long with border zones restricting movement 
on both sides. There are several border crossing points on the Russian land 
borders, several direct flights per day from Russia to Helsinki as well as sea 
ports for both passengers and goods delivery and regular train connections. To 
Estonia, there are, in addition to aviation, goods transported by sea and private 
boating, and numerous daily passenger ship connections from Tallinn to 
Helsinki. In 2007, Finland was the only Schengen country neighbouring the 
Russian Federation.  
The entry and residence in Finland of foreign nationals is subject to the 
provisions of the Finnish Aliens Act and Aliens Decree and the Schengen 
Agreement and Convention. Entry documents refer to visa, residence permit 
and work permit. A visa is required to enter the Schengen area from the 
citizens of most non-European countries as well as of those countries that are 
not members of the European Union (with the exception of Norway on the 
grounds of established long-term Nordic cooperation). Accordingly, a visa is 
necessary for Russian citizens to enter Finland.  
Table 1: Regions of origin, sending countries and trafficking routes to 
Finland 
Region of Origin Sending Countries Routes 
Ex-Soviet countries Ukraine, Belarus Russia, Estonia 
South East Asia China, India Air direct to Helsinki-
Vantaa  
Eastern Europe Romania, Bulgaria,  Estonia, Sweden varying 
trans-European routes, 
mainly air, sea and car  
East Africa Somalia Air direct or via mainland 
Europe 
 
The study focussed on travellers from Russia and through Russia. The 
interviews did not refer to specific instances of individual travel routes and 
reasons but instead contained general information on routes, nationalities and 
reasons to start travelling. The voyage may be initiated; 
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1. individually, 
2. with the help of a travel agency,  
3. as part of package tour, 
4. in the context of forcing or luring the victim to prostitution,  
5. in the context of exploiting a victim of child trade, or 
6. the victim may be blackmailed or forced in some other manner  
Overland traffic between Finland and Russia take place at all crossing-points 
on the Finnish-Russian border. The journeys mainly start from Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, and concentrate on the southern Finland border guard stations. In 
addition, the northern part of Finland receives significant numbers of travellers 
who have started their journey from Murmansk. The method of hiding 
immigrants in goods traffic was considered to be an unlikely occurrence and 
was not cited during interviews. Border crossings hiding immigrants in 
passenger traffic or by using false documentation was referred to as a common 
occurrence. Walking through the Russian and Finnish forests was considered 
unlikely or even impossible. The main obstacle to walking is the Northern 
broad wilderness and its demanding natural conditions. The Russian border 
zone is set at 40 kilometres in the South and 100 kilometres in the North. 
Russians guard the border zone carefully and check papers of all persons who 
are entering into or moving inside the zone.  
Immigrants seeking asylum were discussed during the interviews. The 
migrating asylum seekers were said to be travelling to receive subsistence 
benefits. Their number in the Nordic countries was said to be large, estimates 
in 2004 suggest there were approximately 1,000 such people in Finland. As the 
volume of such migrants has increased, Finnish law has been amended. The 
new legislation allows a fast-track procedure of the asylum applications and a 
rapid deportation. A second large group abusing the asylum seeker status were 
said to be the citizens of the former CSI countries. They are supposedly 
abusing the Finnish welfare system and the lengthy processing time of asylum 
applications, in order to receive unfounded subsistence support and in order to 
commit property crimes in Finland while waiting for the asylum decision. It 
was a commonly held opinion that asylum seekers from CIS countries are 
being controlled by organised crime groups in the source countries, and these 
groups also collect the profits of the operations. One piece of evidence in 
support of this assumption was maintained to be that asylum is sought in 
certain inland cities in Finland, rather that immediately on the border. 
Finally, a third distinct group comprises smuggled persons and those who 
participate in the smuggling. The volume of persons smuggled from Russia to 
Finland was thought to be small although interviews referred to some particular 
cases in recent years. The smugglers are usually their countrymen or Finnish 
people who call themselves sponsors. Serious suspicions were said to be 
connected to rail and sea transports, where smuggling was thought to be most 
likely in practice, although concrete examples were not cited. A concrete 
example of smuggling was the case where a group of Tamils were brought to 
Finland concealed in secret compartments constructed into a bus.  
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Methods 
The research team decided that the main data collection method in all 
participant countries would be non-structured thematic interviews. In Finland, 
interviews were completed with 31 Finnish authority representatives and 
representatives of the private sector. The interviewed persons were selected to 
represent equally different PCB authorities and persons with non-governmental 
backgrounds. The Finnish regional diversity was also reflected in the selection 
of the interviewees. The fieldwork was conducted over a period of three and 
half months. 
Interviews indicated that visas were routinely acquired fraudulently because a 
visa for one Schengen country allows free travel in the entire Schengen area. 
Misleading information may comprise giving incorrect data, fake invitations, 
false purpose of travel, forged passports, etc. Two issues that were frequently 
discussed in the interviews were that forged documents are commonly used 
and that the forgery process is relatively easy. According to the interviewees, 
forged documents are commonly produced in Russia, Lithuania and Thailand. 
In Lithuania and Thailand, the entire document is forged, while in Russia, it is 
most common to forge stamps of passports and visas. In recent years, couriers 
of travel agents in Finland have often been robbed, as they have been carrying 
new passports with genuine visas.  
Corruption 
In Finnish legislation, the word “corruption” does not exist as such. However, 
actions related to corruption are criminalized in the Finnish legal system by 
different provisions: active and passive bribery (also in aggravated form) of 
domestic, foreign and international officials, active and passive bribery (also in 
aggravated form) in the private sector, accounting offences, laundering of 
proceeds from any offence, including failure to report suspicious transactions, 
misuse (and aggravated misuse) of public office and violation (including 
negligent violation) of official duties. Moreover, the legislation provides for the 
criminal liability of corporate actors for bribery and aggravated bribery both in 
the public and the private sector and for money laundering. 
Finland has signed the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions 
and ratified the OECD Convention on active bribery of foreign public officials 
in international business transactions, and the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime; the UN Convention Against Corruption has 
been signed and the Convention itself entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
The articles of the UN Corruption Convention do not require amendments in 
the Finnish legislation. However, in practice the provisions on the prevention 
of corruption are so extensive that the present action against corruption needs 
to be intensified and cooperation between the public and private sector as well 
as with the civil society need to be increased. 
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It has been stated that organized crime is not a matter of significant concern in 
Finland as just a small number of criminal groups have been detected and there 
is no evidence of connections between bribery and the activities of organized 
criminal groups. The figures in general point out that there is a very low level 
of corruption in Finland.  
Accordingly, the common view is that corruption is not a problem either for 
public or private sector. According to the Corruption Perception Indexes issued 
by Transparency International, Finland frequently belongs to the group of the 
least corrupted countries. The explanation given for this is the high moral 
standard of the Finnish civil servants, their independence in exercising their 
duties, the monitoring systems built into the administrations and, above all, the 
transparency of the society and its institutions (Greco 1, 15). It can also be 
mentioned that transparency in society and administration is rather a general 
rule, guaranteed in the Constitution which provides for a principle of free 
access to information, which means that restrictions must be considered as an 
exception. Accordingly, the idea of an open and transparent society and 
administration is a very important factor in Finland and inevitably leads only to 
a small amount of corruption. 
Russian corruption after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s “was not 
merely a continuation of the Soviet administrative tradition of unofficial 
mediators, nor was it merely a result of the economic crisis but it serves as a 
prime example of the restructuring process in the administrative culture which 
has been going through a major transition…” (Heusala 2005, 258). In Russia, 
the political and macro-economic changes did not take place in a vacuum of 
administrative culture. The market of administrative dependencies was broken 
down and had been socially supported mainly by unofficial network traditions 
which needed to be replaced with new structures. Meanwhile, some of the 
major administrative decision making was done in a legal vacuum. This 
resulted in the administrative culture becoming more vulnerable to corruption. 
(Heusala 2005, 258). Also, it has been called “the monetarisation of non-
official practices” meaning that what used to be a traditional norm of using 
kinship, friendship and collegiality has transformed itself into a market of 
services sold to the highest bidder, and what used to be a matter of unofficial 
arrangements and debts of gratitude, became direct bribery (Heusala 2005 258-
256). This interpretation has been supported through the interviews among 
Finnish authority representatives. 
The various interviews state that corruption does not exist on the Finnish side 
of the border or among the Finnish authorities. Only rarely, bribery occurs. 
However, the cultural differences between the two countries make it difficult to 
distinguish between what should be regarded as bribery and what is normal 
behaviour of giving presents. Big boxes of chocolate and bottles of sparkling 
wine (Russian “champagne”) often accompany visa applications. 
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Official approaches 
The provisions regarding illegal immigration and the arrangement of illegal 
immigration (also in aggravated form, introduced 650/2004) are contained in 
chapter 17 of the Finnish Penal Code (563/1998). The provisions regarding the 
arrangement of illegal immigration have been amended to the effect that they 
are also applicable to such activity when its sole intent is transit through 
Finland to some other country. The punishment for illegal immigration is a fine 
or imprisonment up to one year and for petty offence fine only. The 
punishment for arrangement of illegal immigration is fine or imprisonment up 
to 2 years, and for the aggravated form of this offence, imprisonment at the 
minimum of 4 months and a maximum of 6 years. 
In Finland the most important governmental agencies regarding border security 
are the police, the customs and the border guard (PCB). The police and the 
customs are set up in a civilian way whereas the border guard is a military 
agency. In addition there are other specialized agencies, such as the 
immigration agency and traffic control agency dealing with immigration. 
The 2004 Finnish Internal Safety Programme sets the maintenance of border 
and customs security as a main priority. This includes the prevention and 
detection of illegal immigration into Finland and the promotion of projects 
which support the opportunities of authorities responsible for border control at 
external borders to combat threats arriving to the territory of the EU already at 
the borders. Another aim is to maintain the risk of detection for illegal 
immigrants and perpetrators of offences related to illegal immigration in inland 
Finland as well as combating and investigating effectively illegal immigration, 
arrangement of illegal immigration and other cross-border crime. Measures to 
fulfil these tasks include such as the establishing of joint criminal intelligence 
and analysis centres of the police, customs and border guard; the improving of 
border control technology; assigning more personnel to the eastern border and 
in South-Eastern Finland to maintain border security, and by accelerating the 
processing of asylum applications and preventing the abuse of the asylum 
procedure. 
The Finnish PCB cooperation with the Russian counterparts (the militia, the 
customs and the border guard) is being carried out both at national, regional 
and local levels as well as through bilateral cooperation. There are also 
bilateral crime prevention agreements between Finland and Russia and Finland 
and Estonia allowing, in theory, direct contacts between “grassroots level” 
officials on both sides of the border. In practice, this is somewhat problematic 
as the decision-making culture in the two countries is different and, although 
neighbouring countries, the language barrier is high. The information about the 
Russian authorities and their activities is mainly based on discussions held at 
international and national meetings which have a tradition of many decades. A 
crucial point of cooperation is that each agency gets the information it needs. It 
has to be noted, however, that the application of the other party’s best practices 
in the other’s own activities has not led to any significant results. This is of 
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course due to the fact that both countries have developed their own particular 
and diverse ways of operating over hundreds of years and the tradition is not 
easy to change. One significant factor in bilateral cooperation is that if a bond 
of friendship has been developed, it always eases procedures. 
Literature available regarding the international cooperation between the 
Finnish PCB authorities is limited as is literature regarding the practical work 
of the Russian PBC organisations. Legislation regarding the activities of the 
Russian authorities is available but practice has shown that these are being 
applied in different ways in different places. In Finland, it is not always clear 
which agency is responsible for controlling the application of a certain Act, and 
what might be the sanctions if the Act is not applied. However, future border 
cooperation between Finland and Russia and Estonia will continue because of 
the need to ensure secure and non-porous external European Union borders. 
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CHAPTER 6: UNITED KINGDOM 
Introduction and movement of people within the UK 
The UK is now primarily a country of destination for migrants, legal, illegal 
and trafficked. The numbers of immigrants of any type in 2005 was estimated 
at 5.4 million21. It is difficult to estimate the size of the trafficked population in 
the UK as most of the research to date has focused on trafficking of women 
and children for sexual exploitation and there is a lack of knowledge regarding 
the significance of trafficking for labour exploitation22. Home Office research 
suggests that the size of the UK market was £275 million in 2003 and that there 
were 400 trafficked women in the UK23. As both these figures relate to 
trafficking for sexual exploitation only, it is probable that the figures under 
represent the extent of trafficking in the UK. On a wider scale, the size of the 
illegal migrant population has been estimated at 430,000 or 0.7% of the total 
population in 200124. However, it is not known what proportion of this 
population have been trafficked. 
Historically, the migration paths into the UK were determined by the flow of 
people from Commonwealth countries. There is a wide diversity of trafficked 
victims to the UK, indicating a large number of trafficking routes and 
organisations involved. 84 potential victims recovered in official operations in 
the UK in 2006 originated from 22 countries mainly in Eastern Europe, China, 
South-East Asia Africa and Brazil25. It is acknowledged that little is known 
about the exact routes taken by traffickers and whether these routes differ for 
different types of trafficking26. Research by the Home Office has identified 
four main routes into the UK as a summary of the existing research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 www.iom.int 
22 Home Office (2007b) p.1 
23 ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’ (2007a) Home Office, p.14 
24 ‘Sizing the Unauthorised (illegal) migrant population in the UK in 2001’ (2005) Home 
Office 
25 ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’ (2007a) Home Office, p.15 
26 ‘Trafficking for the Purposes of Labour Exploitation’ (2007b) Home Office, p.9 
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Table 2: Sending countries and trafficking routes to the UK27 
Region of Origin Sending Countries Routes 
South America Brazil Lisbon 
South East Asia Thailand, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Singapore 
Air direct to Heathrow or 
via mainland Europe 
Central/Eastern Europe Lithuania, Hungary, 
Ukraine, Belarus 
Varying trans-European 
routes using air, sea and 
rail (e.g. via Greece and 
Italy) 
East and West Africa Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda 
Air direct or via mainland 
Europe 
 
However, it needs to be noted that these routes are not static as the organisation 
of migration crime changes to adapt to new threats and to exploit new 
vulnerabilities and opportunities. Migration routes are essentially snapshots in 
time of how immigration crime is organised at that particular moment. 
Anecdotal evidence from victims indicates a number of methods of entry into 
the UK28; 
 Presenting at ports of entry with false or illegally obtained legitimate 
visas or documents 
 Being accompanied by a male escort posing as a partner 
 Clandestine smuggling 
Evidence from the UK has identified loosely structured organised crime groups 
involved in human trafficking, some of which are connected with the sex 
industry. The formation of these groups is thought to revolve around family 
networks, kinship and geographical regionalism and ex-patriate communities. 
Corruption 
There is no systemic corruption problem in the UK, there were isolated 
instances of corruption within some key agencies, however, these were not 
organised and were very much the exception to the norm. Officials reported an 
anti-corruption culture within the agencies and commented on the anti-
corruption strategies that were in place. Source countries were more vulnerable 
to the possibility of corruption. For example, the visa application process was 
                                                 
27 ‘Stopping Traffic’ (2000) Home Office, p.23 
28 ‘Stopping Traffic’ (2000) Home Office, p.25 
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considered to be vulnerable in some source countries. Evidence for the use of 
fraudulent documents consisted of high quality forgeries of varying 
nationalities produced using advanced technology suggesting links with 
organised crime groups. This level of forgery is difficult to detect, requiring 
highly skilled officers. Documents were found to be used several times, 
facilitating the entry of several people. During the participant observation a 
Russian national was being facilitated into the UK by the use of a forged 
Lithuanian passport. The woman was being driven by a Lithuanian national 
resident in the UK. They were posing as husband and wife and the passports 
were evidence of their ‘marriage’. The woman had been collected in Russia 
and driven to the UK border. There was no indication of why the woman was 
being facilitated into the country or what the modes of payment were for the 
male courier. The view of the immigration officers was that the man was 
probably an active courier because of the passport. The protective covering 
over the photograph had been removed so many times that it had stretched 
when being put back and this had been spotted by the immigration officers. It 
was this plus the passport was in the name of the courier’s wife that suggested 
that he was active in facilitating women into the UK.  
Exploitation 
Research into the experiences of exploitation is focused primarily on victims of 
trafficking for sexual exploitation. In the reported human trafficking cases the 
women pay for the initial journey through prostitution and then discover that 
the ongoing charges for accommodation and any number of added extras result 
in their being unable to save or to emancipate themselves from the traffickers 
or those to whom they have been sold. Refusal or difficulties in meeting 
financial obligations can result in abuse, threats, physical and sexual abuse29. 
The limited evidence relating to those trafficked for labour exploitation 
suggests that they experience a range of exploitative conditions; reduced/no 
pay, excessive hours, lack of breaks, poor health and safety arrangements, 
dangerous working conditions, abuse, threats, intimidation and isolation30. 
Official law enforcement approaches 
The decision for the UK to opt out of the Schengen agreement increases the 
importance of developing and maintaining secure borders. Border controls and 
checks that do not need to occur in Schengen countries are still taking place in 
the UK. It is difficult to assess where to prioritise attempts to address the 
problem. It depends on whether the majority of exploitation is occurring with 
                                                 
29 ‘Stopping Traffic’ (2000) Home Office, p.25-6 
30 ‘Trafficking for the Purposes of Labour Exploitation’ (2007b) Home Office, p.8 
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those people who enter the country illegally or whether people who are in the 
country legally start to become exploited once they have overstayed. 
The UK legislation that addresses trafficking in human beings is primarily as 
follows; 
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003 relating to the trafficking of persons 
for the purposes of sexual exploitation 
 The Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 relating to trafficking for 
exploitation other than for sexual exploitation 
 The Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 regulates the provision of 
labour in agricultural and shellfish gathering industries 
 The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 covers the 
employment of illegal workers 
One of the key approaches of the UK has been Operation Pentameter and 
Pentameter II. These operations are multi-agency, nation-wide victim-focussed 
approaches to human trafficking. The operations have reported 188 women 
rescued and 134 persons charged31. The success of operation Pentameter II has 
been called into question by the Guardian newspaper’s special inquiry into the 
outcome of Operation Pentameter II (see http/www.) The POPPY project, 
funded by the Home Office is the only project in the UK to provide support 
and accommodation for female victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation32. 
The creation of the UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) will provide 
central point for the collection of data relating to trafficking in human beings 
and for the development of ways in which to approach the problem. However, 
the UKHTC has been severely criticised as failing to meet the multi-agency 
objectives that underpin it: 
“...the UK Action Plan placed a huge emphasis on UKHTC's role as a 
multi-agency body, the central repository of all data on human trafficking, 
offering strategic and operational support and a 24/7 support line for 
advice, including on the care of victims. It is therefore disappointing that 
so many of our witnesses suggested it was not really multi-agency, being 
dominated by the police and UKBA; that it was not doing much work to 
produce the badly-needed estimates of the scale of trafficking; that it was 
not fully aware of the needs and rights of child victims; and that recent 
operations and individual cases had shown a lack of clarity in 
responsibilities and a failure to give useful advice on the support available 
for suspected victims.” (Stationery Office 2009:Para 189) 
REFLEX teams were established as multi-agency task forces involving the 
government, law enforcement, CPS, immigration, security and foreign office 
that aim to combat organised immigration crime through: prevention, police-
led intelligence operations and enforcement. Again, REFLEX has an organised 
                                                 
31 www.pentameter.police.uk 
32 Richards, S. (2006) ‘Hope Betrayed’ The POPPY Project: London 
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crime priority and only responds to instances of organised immigration crime, 
not opportunistic illegal immigration. Once again this narrows the focus as it 
assumes a very organised approach to immigration crime and human 
trafficking. There is little evidence that such crimes are so organised as 
assumed by SOCA, UKHTC and REFLEX. 
Recent changes have tightened entry restrictions into the UK with borders now 
being seen to extend into the country of origin33 as a result of the requirement 
that a person be in possession of an entry visa before they leave the country 
(for countries outside the EU). The increasing use of technology in border 
control also shows the way in which borders are being extended and 
strengthened. Border controls along the borders with France and Belgium are 
increasingly using techniques such as heat sensors and heart rate detectors. The 
e-Borders programme in the UK aims to use the collection of information on 
international databases to identify individuals who present a risk.  
The future strategy appears to locate border control in the UK under the 
auspices of the United Kingdom Border Agency, the Police, the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency and Customs and Excise, indicating a multi-agency 
approach34. The large number of agencies involved with border control in the 
UK has prompted discussions about the value of creating a single entity 
responsible for all border control which would prevent duplicate questioning 
and investigation and this is still to be decided. 
                                                 
33 Broeders, D. (2007) ‘The New Digital Borders of Europe’ International Sociology, Vol. 22, 
No. 1 
34 Home Office (2007a) ‘UK Action Plan on Tackling Human Trafficking’ p.30 
40 
CHAPTER 7: MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF 
MOVEMENT OF ILLEGAL PERSONS  
A case study of the UK 
Introduction 
To gauge how official responses are received and constructed, and how official 
agencies utilise popular conceptions about illegal migration it was decided that 
a review of newspapers should be undertaken as a means of investigating how 
contemporary legal prosecutions had been socially constructed. To enable a 
structured review of cases the following process was undertaken. A review of 
‘current cases’ was undertaken by compiling information from various public 
sources. The newspapers used were ‘The Guardian’, ‘The Telegraph’ and ‘The 
Daily Mail’ along with the reports on news on the BBC website. A legal 
database was also accessed to review appeal judgements in relevant cases.  
In order to explore media reporting of illegal immigrants, the same searches 
were carried out on several media websites. BBC online, The Guardian, The 
Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail websites were searched to access articles 
relating to illegal immigrants and related offences. The searches resulted in 
approximately one hundred relevant articles, containing details of offences 
relating to illegal immigration or offences for which illegal immigrants were 
convicted. 
Information in relation to the numbers of foreign nationals in custody and a 
breakdown of the offences for which they are imprisoned is difficult to access 
for a number of reasons. The data is frequently presented in conjunction with 
that assessing the numbers of asylum seekers in custody, and the same 
individual may be classified as an asylum seeker or a non-asylum seeker at 
different points in time. It is not clear whether individuals were in the UK 
illegally and committed an offence for which they were then imprisoned, aside 
from the issue of their illegal status or whether they are in prison as a result of 
being in the UK illegally.  
The Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2005 for England and Wales 
states that there were 9,650 foreign national prisoners in 2005 which equated to 
13% of the total prison population. The number of foreign nationals increased 
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by 8% between 2004 and 2005, and 12% of males and 19% of females were 
foreign nationals, according to this report35.  
Press reports: Illegal migration 
Between February and May 2006, there was a flurry of reports in the press 
regarding foreign nationals in custody. A certain amount of ‘public anxiety’ 
was generated by the media concern with the number of foreign nationals, 
1023, who had been released from custody and then been reported for further 
offences. In May, 2006, the BBC reported the offences for which these 1,023 
foreign nationals were convicted, and not subsequently deported36. The 
offences most common offences in this list were drugs offences, 184, using a 
false instrument, 71 and theft and kindred offences, 57. The concern was the 
failure to deport these convicted offenders after release, and so the charge was 
laid that they were able to stay in the UK and continue offending. A search of 
cases was also undertaken of those offences that were reported to have been 
committed by a foreign national and where immigration was not a factor in the 
offending. These are scarce, only 9 of the reports highlighted in the search 
contained such details (see Table 3). The reports related to the following 
offences; 
Table 3: Media Reported Non-Immigration Offences by Foreign Nationals 
Murder 2 
Attempted Murder 1 
Rape 2 
Conspiracy to steal (this related to theft 
from ATMs) 
1 
Possession with intent to supply 1 
Burglary 1 
Offences under the Harassment Act 1 
 
It appears that the offences reported are the more serious offences of those that 
are actually committed by those who are defined by the media as illegal 
immigrants. This suggests that the media give importance to offences 
committed by individuals reoffending on release from custody and those 
people committing more serious offences. There are no official figures about 
which offences are committed by undocumented migrants. The breakdown of 
                                                 
35 Home Office Statistical Bulletin ‘Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2005 for 
England and Wales, December 2006, p.105 
36 15/05/2006 ‘News’ www.bbc.co.uk 
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the prison population from the Offender Management Caseload Statistics 
differentiates between British nationals and foreign nationals. The report states 
that there were 9,650 foreign nationals prisoners in 200537. This is further 
classified by ethnicity although these figures are only available up to 2003. 
However, this classification provides no significant insight into the 
representation of undocumented migrants in offending generally, as it only 
accounts for the prison population. The data does not provide a significant 
insight into the prison population as the data do not identify the country of 
origin or immigration status of the individuals. 
The 2005 Home Office Report ‘A survey of the illegally resident population in 
detention in the UK’ aims to “increase understanding of the illegally resident 
population by describing in depth the characteristics of that part of it that is in 
detention”38. However, the report only accesses undocumented migrants at five 
UK immigration centres and so does not include those undocumented migrants 
who are held in prisons elsewhere. This report acknowledges the lack of data in 
this area generally and the problems of classification between undocumented 
migrants and asylum seeker status. The majority of participants included in this 
study had not committed a criminal offence and were in detention for offences 
relating to immigration only (72 out of 83 participants had not committed a 
criminal offence39).  
The focus of reporting of criminal offences involving undocumented migrants 
concentrates on offences relating to immigration law. There are approximately 
twice as many stories about prosecutions for large scale people smuggling 
operations than there are for smaller incidents. Reports about the large scale 
operations relate to the infiltration of ‘criminal networks’ involved in people 
smuggling organisations producing large amounts of profit. The reports focus 
on the club-class people smuggling, student visa scams, sham marriage rackets, 
passport forgery and ‘gang-masters’ bringing in large numbers of illegal 
immigrants to work in poorly paid jobs in the agriculture, food and sex 
industries. The language in the articles; ‘gang-masters’, ‘criminal networks’, 
‘immigration rackets’ conveys the impression that movement of people across 
borders is a lucrative and organised business and that those people being 
moved lack agency. The articles emphasise the police uncovering large, multi-
million pound organised crime activities, rather than individuals who may have 
been charged with being here illegally.  
At least two themes in the reporting of people who facilitate illegal entry can 
be identified. First, the employing of workers illegally, running businesses 
where workers are employed illegally in, for example, agricultural or factory 
                                                 
37 ‘Offender Management Caseload Statistics 2005’ Home Office Statistical Bulletin, December 
2006, p.105 
38 Black, R., Collyer, M., Skeldon, R. and Waddington, C. ‘A survey of the illegally resident 
population in detention in the UK’ Home Office Online Report 20/05, p.2 
39 Black, R., Collyer, M., Skeldon, R. and Waddington, C. ‘A survey of the illegally resident 
population in detention in the UK’ Home Office Online Report 20/05, p.42 
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work. Second, others are convicted for organising or facilitating their entry but 
do not then go on to employ migrants. The articles include some information 
on the charges brought to the facilitators but make little mention of those who 
have been facilitated. In analysing the articles it is unclear whether those 
people employed or smuggled are deported following the convictions of the 
facilitators. 
The primary offence that people are convicted of in the larger scale operation is 
facilitating illegal entry. However, there are some other prominent offences; 
money laundering, forgery of official documents, people trafficking, trafficking 
into the UK for sexual exploitation and related conspiracy offences. Very few 
of the articles relating to facilitation make reference to ‘people smuggling’ 
There is some reporting of the smaller facilitation offences. However, whilst 
the reason for reporting the large scale operations is the operations themselves, 
the smaller facilitation offence stories tend to contain an unusual aspect. The 
facilitation of children is reported even if there is only one child involved; for 
example, particular attention was given to a story about a woman buying a 
baby from Greece and attempting to return to the UK with the child. Instances 
of facilitation involving vulnerable people are reported, for example, a 
marriage scam taking advantage of a ‘vulnerable teenager’ and the discovery of 
small brothels. Cases gain a high profile if a celebrity or government 
department is involved, for example a breach of security at Sandhurst is 
reported involving the arrest of two undocumented migrants prior to Prince 
William’s arrival. There are several reports of people facilitating entry of small 
numbers of migrants in the back of their lorries or camper vans, for example, a 
man convicted of facilitating illegal entry of nine Chinese people in his camper 
van. A French lorry driver was convicted of facilitating entry for six Chinese 
people. Other individual cases which are reported are those which have some 
ironic aspect, for example, the man who was charged with people smuggling 
whilst working as head of social inclusion for Newcastle City Council or a 
couple who were both criminal justice workers being involved in a love 
triangle with an undocumented migrant. 
With reference to the breadth of reporting of the offences above, the large scale 
operations are reported on the BBC website and for the most part on all of the 
newspaper websites. The smaller incidents tend to only be reported in one or 
two of the sources. 
Conclusions 
The lack of information in this area is acknowledged in reports, as above. It has 
also been acknowledged by the Office of National Statistics who are currently 
examining ways of addressing this gap in the provision of statistics. For the 
time being, the situation remains that it is difficult to access information about 
illegal immigrants generally, and in relation to crime, specifically.  
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The experiences of documented and undocumented 
migrants 
The experience of undocumented migrants reported in the newspapers used for 
the purposes of this report tends to be concentrated on women being trafficked 
into the sex industry. It is acknowledged that this is a problem area although 
the emphasis here was on other victims and whether their experience is 
represented in any of the reports. 
There are a small number of reports in the newspapers reviewed highlighting 
the negative experiences of undocumented migrants as they are trafficked into 
the UK and their standard of living once they arrive. The emphasis of the 
reports is on the futility of the journey and the exploitation of those willing to 
take it. The journeys are reported to be lengthy, often taking months to reach 
their destination for which people pay varying amounts around £3,000. The 
conditions are reported as being cramped and uncomfortable. Upon reaching 
the UK, the jobs undertaken are menial and poorly paid. The phenomenon of 
‘club class people smuggling’ is reported, where people pay larger amounts 
(for example £6,000 or £8,000) to travel in more comfort to the UK. The 
reporting of conditions and standards of living of undocumented migrants is 
not dissimilar to that of migrant workers. Some of the reports relating to the 
conditions of migrant workers are explored below. 
There is a distinction made in the media between victims of trafficking and 
undocumented migrants who are trying to make their may to the UK of their 
own accord. Generally, the victims of trafficking are described as being subject 
to conditions worse than undocumented migrants. The scale of the trafficking 
problem is difficult to describe, the number of people being trafficked is 
variously reported as 2,000 women into the UK in 2004, 2.4 million people 
victims of people trafficking worldwide. 
There are discussions about the ability of those who have been trafficked to 
remain in the country for up to three months once their traffickers have been 
caught, to allow them to access help and support. The government were 
initially cautious about signing the agreement that would permit this stay, for 
fear that people may abuse the privilege and remain in the UK under false 
pretences. The agreement was eventually signed in January 2007 giving 
victims of trafficking temporary residence status and support. 
Where people are arrested for facilitating entry to illegal immigrants, the 
reports tend to focus on those responsible for the facilitation, rather than the 
immigrants. However, there are some indications of the migrants’ experience. 
When a gang were arrested for bringing Turkish undocumented migrants into 
the country, a report detailed that the migrants had paid thousands of pounds to 
reach Britain and were then forced into ‘debt contracts’ with the facilitators, 
having to work in take away outlets 16 hours a day. When papers reported 
Martin Moo being convicted with 10 counts of facilitating illegal entry, the 
workers were described as paying up to £3,000 to start a new life in Britain, 
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only to work in poorly paid jobs in restaurants, most with miserable living 
conditions. Finally, homeless charities have been reported as finding more 
migrants living on the streets after having failed to find work and not being 
able to afford to return home. 
An area where the press is consistent in the construction of victims is in 
relation to children. Several articles refer to systems mainly in place in African 
countries such as Nigeria, there children as young as six are taken from homes 
who cannot afford to bring them up and are placed in homes in European 
countries as domestic workers. In return, they are promised an education but in 
reality, are beaten, not fed adequately, forced to work long hours and forbidden 
to go to school. In all the sites searched, there were reports of a Nigerian girl, 
sixteen years old, who had been sold into prostitution after she, and her family 
were promised a job.  
In numerous newspaper articles, it is reported that estimating the exact 
numbers of migrants, whether legal or illegal is almost impossible. Reports 
indicate figures anywhere between 310,000 and 1.2 million at a national level. 
The problem is also reflected at a regional level. There are several barriers in 
attempting to establish the numbers of migrant workers on a local level. The 
figures produced by local authorities on their websites relate to the figures from 
the last census, in 2001. The make up of the population has changed 
significantly in some areas since 2001 and this is not reflected in the figures. 
The tables of sub-regional population change published by the Office for 
National Statistics include figures of ‘Net migration and other changes’. 
However, these numbers also include changes in the population due to internal 
migration and civilian international migration. It is therefore not possible to 
gain a reliable picture of the destination of migrants once they enter the UK, 
from these figures.40  
A potential source of information in relation to the numbers of migrant workers 
in the UK is the National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals 
(NINo)41 although the obvious limitation here is that it only includes those 
workers who have registered for a National Insurance number. Another 
limitation is that there is a time lag between a migrant worker arriving in the 
country, registering for and being given a NINo. This time lag can be as long 
as several years. However, the data gives some indication of movement and an 
advantage of this data is the range it provides, including overseas students who 
register for a NINo to work part time and those who register for a NINo in 
order to claim benefits. 
Number of NINo registrations to overseas nationals 2004/5 – 439,000 
Number of NINo registrations to overseas nationals 2005/6 – 662,00042 
                                                 
40www.statistics.gov.uk/, Tables of sub regional components of population change 
41 National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals Entering the UK, 2006, 
Department for Work and Pensions 
42 ibid, p.4 
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With reference to the figures above, there has been a 51% increase in NINo 
registrations from 2004/5 to 2005/6. This is further broken down in relation to 
the country of origin of the applicants. The percentage of these overseas 
nationals receiving out of work benefits is 3% for 2004/5, the figures are not 
currently available for 2005/6.43 
Table 4: Overseas Nationals entering the UK and allocated a NINo, by 
year of Registration and Continent of Origin44 
 2004/5 2005/6 
All 439.7 662.4 
Europe – EU 2004 
including Accession 
Countries* 
111.1 271.0 
Europe – EU excluding 
2004 Accession 
Countries 
81.3 97.6 
Europe – non EU 22.2 21.2 
Asia and the Middle East 110.1 134.2 
Australasia and Oceania 23.4 32.5 
The Americas 26.7 31.4 
Africa 64.5 73.9 
Others and Unknown 0.6 0.6 
Figures are shown in thousands. 
*This includes the accession countries joining the EU from 1st May 2004. 
The increase in the registrations from EU member states countries is primarily 
attributable to Polish arrivals, who account for 63% of the 2005/6 registrations 
to nationals from EU member states. NINos are also given in relation to the 
region of residence which gives some indication of the destination of the 
migrants once they enter the UK. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals Entering the UK, 2006, 
Department for Work and Pensions, p.11 
44 www.statistics.gov.uk/ 
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Table 5: Overseas Nationals entering the UK and allocated a NINo, by 
Year of Registration and Region of Residence45 
 2004/5 2005/6 
All 439.7 662.4 
North East 7.3 11.1 
North West 30.7 48.9 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
20.2 36.6 
East Midlands 23.5 38.5 
West Midlands 28.1 41.7 
East of England 34.1 52.8 
London 167.2 235.6 
South East 50.7 79.9 
South West 22.6 33.7 
Wales 9.9 16.4 
Scotland 22.9 41.4 
Northern Ireland 5.5 16.3 
Unknown 17.1 9.4 
Figures are shown in thousands 
The area most popular is London, followed by the South East. The next most 
population destination for migrant workers is the East of England, followed by 
the North West. The lowest NINo registrations are recorded in the North East. 
A local case study in migration – Wrexham 
To examine some of the issues on a smaller scale, Wrexham was chosen as a 
case study as it attracts large numbers of migrant workers. Information was 
gathered from the local press (The Wrexham Evening Leader), the local 
authority website and through contact with the council.  
The articles in the press are varied in theme although overall appear to present 
a balanced view. In January, 2005, there was an article which looked at the 
poor living conditions for migrant workers. The report contains claims that 
                                                 
45National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals Entering the UK, 2006, 
Department for Work and Pensions, p.9 
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many migrant workers were being exploited and afraid to come forward. There 
was an example of a man who is said to be working 50 hours a week for £130. 
The following day, a response was printed from the police and the council 
promising to improve conditions and urging people experiencing problems to 
come forward.46 Since then, a specific officer has been provided for the 
minority community who speaks a number of languages. In July last year, the 
town hosted a ‘Diversity in the Square’ event to celebrate the variety of 
cultures in Wrexham. According to the Evening Leader and confirmed by the 
council, reports of racially motivated crime more than doubled in the year 
2005-6. The police and court services have increased the spending on 
interpreters to better provide for victims and witnesses who are unable to 
understand English. 
Table 6: National Insurance Number Registrations in respect of non-UK 
Nationals47 
 2004/5 2005/6 
Latvia - 10 
Lithuania 10 20 
Czechoslovakia 10 - 
France 10 30 
Germany 10 10 
Hungary - 10 
Poland 550 970 
Czech Republic 10 10 
Slovakia 30 50 
Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10 
It appears that the provisions for the migrant workers have been organised in 
response to the influx of people rather than in preparation for their arrival. Prior 
to 2004/5, there were no Polish nationals in Wrexham who registered for a 
NINo. It would have been difficult to predict the high numbers of Poles who 
would be drawn to the area, and therefore the impact on local resources was 
higher than it may otherwise have been. It appears that the situation has 
improved and that the migrant workers are now integrated more effectively 
into the community with more resources targetted specifically to their needs. 
BNP candidates have stood in local elections in Wrexham with little success, 
                                                 
46 www.eveningleader.co.uk, 19/1/2005, 20/1/2005 
47 Table constructed from information kindly provided by Wrexham Borough Council 
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perhaps indicating that local people accept the migrant workers and recognise 
their contribution to the local economy48. 
The press is generally critical of the immigration and asylum system, 
particularly the Daily Mail. The main points focus on the lack of organisation 
and inability to cope with the large influx of people following the 2004 
accession. There are several reports in the national press about the extra 
pressures placed on welfare, education and health authorities as a result of the 
numbers of migrant workers entering the country. There is an emphasis on high 
numbers of migrants claiming benefits although this is not supported by the 
figures from the Department for Work and Pensions49. Nationally, Wrexham is 
highlighted as a place put under strain in relation to public services although 
this is not reflected in the local press. 
Some of the articles in the national press make links between the high numbers 
of migrant workers, the jobs they are willing to take and the consequences for 
unemployment for British nationals. The Office for National Statistics 
produces figures for regional unemployment. The area with the highest 
unemployment is London, although this is made up of a number of smaller 
areas, ranging from 4.7% to 12.7%. Although this correlates with the place to 
which the largest number of migrants are shown to live (based on the NINo 
registrations), London has many other factors which contribute to the 
unemployment. The South East and the North West have the next highest 
numbers of NINo registrations. The unemployment rates for these regions are 
around 3.7% and 5% respectively.50 These are not significantly higher than 
other regions although more detailed analysis would be necessary to establish 
whether there is a relationship between the numbers of migrants in an area and 
the rate of unemployment. As a final point, the rate of unemployment in 
Wrexham is below the national average51. 
Although migrant workers appear to be at an advantage over illegal immigrants 
with the rights to which they are entitled, some of the press reports indicate that 
they are subject to similar poor conditions as illegal immigrants. Migrant 
workers who entered the UK to work on farms and in the food industry were 
reportedly made to pay for their accommodation and paid a pittance. There are 
some reports of migrant workers being subject to extreme racist language and 
are only allowed to enter certain bars and cafes. Articles from summer 2006 
relating to the strawberry polytunnels indicate that migrant workers were being 
exploited, receiving low pay, living in sub-standard and expensive 
accommodation and their bosses were accused of profiting unduly from their 
stay. Newspapers give various examples of individuals experiencing poor 
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49 National Insurance Number Allocations to Overseas Nationals Entering the UK, 2006, 
Department for Work and Pensions, p.9-11 
50 www.statistics.go.uk, Labour Market, Local Unemployment 
51 Information provided by Wrexham Borough Council 
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living conditions, being paid low wages and being forced to pay for 
accommodation which they share with several other people.  
The reports of migrant workers taking advantage of the welfare system and 
placing undue strain on hospitals and schools are incongruous with the stories 
of their negative transport and living experiences. These two themes run 
through the comments made in the press and in other websites with interest in 
this area and may create stereotypes for the general public who receive little 
additional information to increase their knowledge. As a result, migrant 
workers may be constructed as either scroungers or victims, when they in fact 
may be neither. 
Another problem that arises for migrant workers is what happens to them if 
they become illegal. There are various articles about the practicalities of 
deporting overstayers and undocumented migrants, for example, the time and 
the cost of removal. There are problems reported due to a lack of resources 
which have resulted in people being left to work with the knowledge of the 
authorities because their removal is not a priority. There are suggestions in 
some articles relating to the Morecambe Bay cockle pickers that the 
government allowed illegal workers to continue working instead of deporting 
them. Stemming from this is criticism that the conditions in which the cockle 
pickers lived and the tragedy which occurred, has not altered and the sea 
industry, by not demanding changes to conditions, is endorsing their treatment.  
Discussion 
The countries joining the EU as part of the A8 accession in 2004 were Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. Nationals of Malta and Cyprus have full rights to work in the 
UK. Nationals of the other countries were subject to transitional measures to 
regulate their access to the labour market.52 Nationals of these countries who 
wish to take up work are required to register with the Workers Registration 
Scheme (WRS). These figures do not include people who are self employed as 
these people are not required to register with the WRS. The WRS figures show 
that there were 447,000 applicants from 1st May 2004 to 30th June 2006, 
427,000 of whom were issued with certificates53. When Bulgaria and Romania 
joined the EU in January 2007, tighter restrictions were placed on their 
working capabilities. John Reid announced that the places on the low skilled 
migration scheme would be restricted for nationals from Romania and Bulgaria 
and food processing and agriculture would be the only sectors open to less 
skilled A2 nationals.54 
                                                 
52 Accession Monitoring Report, Home Office, Aug. 2006, p.1 
53 Ibid, p.5 
54 John Reid’s statement on migrant workers, accessed at www.bbc.co.uk 
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The process of Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU and the question of 
immigration from these countries is widely reported. The government were 
widely criticised for failing to predict the numbers of migrant workers who 
would enter in 2004. These numbers were used in some articles to argue for 
tighter restrictions on the working ability of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. 
Perspectives on the potential immigration from these countries vary. Some 
articles contain ‘warnings’ about the numbers of people queuing for visas and 
the type of people that will be able to enter the UK once Bulgaria and Romania 
join the EU (‘undesirables’). One article continues to describe a desolate image 
of Bulgaria, people selling their children, living in slums, being governed by 
criminal gangs, with the overall suggestion that this will all soon be coming 
over to UK. The Telegraph gives a similar picture of the type of people who 
will be coming Britain from Romania and Bulgaria. One article describes 
Romania as follows; ‘the ghettos are home to extortion, human trafficking of 
women for prostitution, and loan-sharking. Roma gangs export begging, drug 
trafficking, baby-selling and other menaces, entrenching suspicion and 
resentment among ethnic Bulgarians’55.  
Measures for dealing with Romanians and Bulgarians who abuse the system 
are reported with the emphasis on employers taking responsibility for 
employing registered workers and being subject to penalties if they are 
employed undocumented workers from Romania or Bulgaria. This is similar to 
the way in which the agents and subjects of facilitation are reported; 
highlighting collective responsibility over that of the individual. The 
restrictions and the measures for their control are reviewable after 12 months to 
check whether the decision is too conservative. 
With reference to Hansard, there seems to be little debate regarding whether 
restrictions would be placed on Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. During a 
Select Committee in July 2006, Mr. Hoon was asked whether individuals from 
Bulgaria and Romania would enjoy the same rights as those from other 
countries. The response at this time was that no discrimination would be made 
on the basis of ethnic origin56. In November, 2006, Mr Throlstrup commented 
that it is not practical to have complete free movement of workers as the 
population would increase insupportably and unsustainably57. 
The lack of communication about the decision is acknowledged in the Home 
Affairs and European Scrutiny Committee discussion in December 200658. 
Concern is voiced in this discussion about the short notice of the decision and 
the damage done to the relationship between the UK and Romania and 
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Bulgaria. In response, justification for the decision is given by highlighting that 
other countries have also imposed restrictions, for example, Germany, France 
and Spain. 
The issue of illegal workers is raised in this meeting by the opposition 
commenting that the bureaucracy and time involved in becoming a legal 
resident forces people into working in the shadow economy. The response to 
this is that it is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that the individual 
has obtained the relevant legal requirements to enable them to work. The 
question of how this will assist in preventing migrant workers from accessing 
the shadow economy during the time it takes to apply to the registration 
scheme remains unanswered. Additional related measures to help to deal with 
the problem are increasing the numbers of immigration staff and highlighting 
the importance of sharing information between agencies, nationally and 
internationally, to protect vulnerable workers. The Government also make 
reference to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) being able to create 
databases and share information on a larger scale and to begin to extinguish the 
demand for the services which trafficking meets in the UK. 
In April 2006, the Government passed into law the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006, which grants everybody in the EU, 
including Romania and Bulgaria, an unconditional right of residence, with 
access to education and health care from the moment of entry. There is debate 
surrounding whether the restrictions placed on the workers entering the UK 
from Bulgaria and Romania is incongruous with this piece of legislation. 
Questions to Margaret Beckett in December 2006 address this issue59. She 
points out that the freedom of movement legislation is not intended to confer 
the same rights as this piece of legislation. The opposition are critical of the 
situation in that people should either be allowed to live and work as full 
residents or not permitted to live in the UK at all. The concern is reiterated that 
the process of registration will place people in a vulnerable position forcing 
them to work ‘underground’. Attempting to limit the potential political damage 
from increased migration as a result of further accession, the UK government 
legislated to try to control migratory flows. However, a consequence of such an 
approach could be an increase in undocumented workers and increases in their 
vulnerability to labour exploitation. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this research project was to investigate the levels of corruption at 
border crossing points between Estonia and Finland, Russia and Finland and at 
UK border crossings. The project was designed to overcome some of the data 
gathering problems previously experienced; however, whilst some of the issues 
were addressed, for example The Country Based Project Network Groups 
provided a forum for law enforcement professionals to debate openly 
approaches to the problem of illegal movements of people and to share, in an 
informal setting, theoretical frameworks and understandings, the difficulties in 
securing reliable data persisted. One of the key issues in relation to the 
movement of people is that it can easily become focused on the issue of 
‘human trafficking’, and when this term is used it is apparent that not everyone 
means the same thing. The Palermo Convention provides an agreed definition 
and the critical factor is the use and abuse of power by the trafficker. One 
conclusion from this project is that there are a number of different 
interpretations of the term trafficking. The project was designed to consider 
illegal movement but law enforcement policy definers were keen to shift the 
discussion to one of trafficking with a particular focus on sexual exploitation. 
This does create some difficulty in being able to obtain a clear picture of the 
movement of people and the motivations for such movements.  
For example, the UK qualitative data with border guards suggests that the main 
focus of work is on facilitation and on individuals attempting to breach the 
border by individual enterprise. This is far removed from the official policy 
that is focused on organised crime and systematic forms of illegal movement of 
people. Such a disparity of approach makes it difficult to ensure that definitions 
and terms are kept separate and not used interchangeably, so that trafficking is 
not used when facilitation is the accurate description of the process. A similar 
process is evidenced in the Estonian data where a range of Organised Crime 
groups are accused of being active in the illegal movement of people and yet 
there is little reliable data that such groups are involved. However, even with a 
paucity of data there is still a causal link made between organised crime and 
human trafficking. The Finnish data also provides indications of similar 
processes. The first conclusion from the data is that there is a link made 
between organised crime and trafficking, this link may be difficult to evidence 
as there is a paucity of data and problems to ensure that all participants are 
indeed counting the same thing. 
As noted above all three countries construct the trafficking problem primarily 
as one of trafficking women for sexual exploitation. The data from the UK 
suggests that those law enforcement officers involved in operations did not 
think that many women were victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation but 
rather that there was an active flow of women who were coming into the UK 
and Finland to work in the sex industry; the flow of inward migrants to Estonia 
was small, but there was little evidence of an active human trafficking for 
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sexual exploitation ‘business’ but again women leaving the country to work in 
the sex industry. The Estonian report suggests that there is consent by the 
women to migrate to work in the sex industry and that there is little or no 
violence used or threatened to encourage the movement of women into the sex 
industry. This tends to suggest that there are active sex industries in Finland 
and the UK and that these are viewed as lucrative and potential markets for 
women to work in and so encourages movement across borders. There was also 
evidence that women migrate from the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus for 
similar reasons.  
It is apparent from the data that forged documents were an essential element of 
any movement, other than clandestine entry, and that law enforcement officials 
reported that these documents were easily obtained. There was also some 
speculation in the interview data that such documents required organizing and 
so it was assumed that organised crime was involved in their production and 
distribution. However, it was apparent that operational law enforcement 
officers did not consider that these document providing organised crime groups 
were particularly cohesive but rather were loose networks and affiliations. This 
tends to confound the dominant view of trans-national networks, but the data 
suggests that documents can be sourced in a number of ways and have a degree 
of flexibility and adaptability. This finding tends to strengthen the conclusion 
that the movement of people is also organised in a loose network rather than 
the more hierarchical traditional organised crime group.  
There is nothing in the data to suggest that there is either endemic corruption or 
systemic corruption in any of the three partner countries to the research. 
Respondents recalled individual cases, at differing levels, of corruption but 
there was no evidence that there was organised corruption or that officials were 
systematically susceptible to corruption. It was agreed that there were problems 
for governments in being able to manage corruption that happened in 
embassies overseas but there seemed to be robust checks and balances against 
corruption. It was also evident that there was an anti-corruption culture 
amongst border guards in all three participating countries. The lack of systemic 
corruption was an important element in the development of trust relationships 
between the law enforcement participants in the research but there was a level 
of scepticism about the possible levels of corruption of law enforcement 
official in some states bordering but external to the EU.  
As mentioned previously there is much in the qualitative data from the 
interviews with law enforcement officials that discusses human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation. This focus on sexual exploitation by officials, in policy 
documents and in some academic approaches to the topic area of moving 
people across borders illegally is not uncommon and this research is no 
exception. The project team in designing the project deliberately entitled the 
project ‘Organised crime, corruption and the movement of people across 
borders in the new enlarged EU: A case study of Estonia, Finland and the UK’ 
to avoid the dominance of the project by human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. However, senior law enforcement officials have this form of 
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trafficking as very high on their agenda and law enforcement operational staff 
are more sceptical of the claims that large numbers of women are ‘trafficked’. 
However, one consequence of this approach is the focus by law enforcement 
officials in determining the victim status of women, and it is here that consent 
is used as a determining factor. A woman is more likely to receive support 
services if she is defined by officials as a trafficked woman, whereas a woman 
who is viewed as to consenting to work in the sex industry is more likely to be 
treated as an undocumented migrant and deported. A woman’s consent to 
prostitution or lack of it appears to be a key factor in determining her access to 
support and welfare services.  
The Country Based Project Network Groups were comprised initially of the 
identifiable law enforcement stakeholders; police, border guards and customs. 
In establishing the groups the identified participants were asked to suggest 
other possible relevant agencies for inclusion. So, for example, in the UK the 
Home Office participated in The Country Based Project Network Group 
because of the REFLEX initiative that was funded by the Home Office to 
tackle organised immigration crime from a multi-agency perspective. In 
Estonia a member of the local office of International Organisation of Migration 
attended the network group. This demonstrates some movement away from the 
groups comprising singularly law enforcement officials; however, the scope of 
attendees was relatively small and does not reflect Mameli’s view that it is 
important to understand the trafficking of human beings from a wider 
perspective and consider the inclusion of diverse organisations with an interest 
in human trafficking, for example, healthcare60. This was in element a flaw of 
the research design that did not consider to increase the potential scope of the 
members of The Country Based Project Network Groups, however, it also 
demonstrates the particularly narrowed vision of law enforcement even when 
they are encouraged, as in the UK, to work with a multi-disciplinary approach.  
There are two significant issues in relation to data collection. First, there needs 
to be a detailed examination of how to collect, or bring together, quantitative 
data that is reliable in estimating the number of undocumented migrants. If it is 
not possible to have in place a reliable means of estimating the number of 
undocumented migrants then official sources should refrain from giving 
estimates that are at best crude. The lack of reliable quantitative data results in 
the problem being over-stated, with claims made of large numbers of 
undocumented migrants entering destination and transit countries. One 
potential outcome of this is that policy and resourcing decisions are made on 
‘facts’ that are contained within the quantitative data and which are based on 
speculative assumptions. Therefore, further research should be commissioned 
to explore how to develop a model that provides an estimate of the numbers of 
undocumented migrants that is based on known and reliable data. In order for 
effective approaches to undocumented migration to be developed in the future, 
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it is vital that sources of data collection are widened and methods of data 
collection are improved and standardised. 
Qualitative data is also not unproblematic. Much of the qualitative data 
collected in this project was from law enforcement officials and ministry 
officials. The approach to the issue of undocumented migrants taken by these 
respondents was one where the crime is a trans-national and organised and 
where human trafficking for sexual exploitation is a key focus. The problem is 
that there are no other voices to be heard in the data. Undocumented migrants, 
those involved in the facilitation of migrants across borders and those 
providing support to undocumented migrants do not have a voice in this 
research, and in much of the research on this topic. On reflection the project 
should have included more widely local and national groups involved with 
providing advice and support and campaigning on behalf of undocumented 
migrants. This was partly achieved in the UK by the involvement of Anti-
Slavery International and in Estonia with the inclusion of IOM. Data collection 
is a sensitive and complex task, there are ethical issues involved in 
interviewing undocumented migrants and people who have been trafficked, 
however, it is our view that this project demonstrates a need for much wider 
data collection in order to ensure a view through a wider lens.  
Finally, some reflections on the method used in the research. There were 
slightly different responses across the three countries. In Estonia there was a 
willingness of law enforcement agencies to be involved but there was also an 
issue of resources in terms of staff and time. This meant that it was more 
difficult to establish The Country Based Project Network Group and once 
established to ensure continuity. In Finland there was a degree of enthusiasm 
for the The Country Based Project Network Group as it provided a focus on a 
particular area of work and concern. There was a strong law enforcement 
response and presence within the group. In the UK The Country Based Project 
Network Group was well attended because the research project chimed with the 
concerns of the moment. However, one outcome was that the approach of law 
enforcement was driven by government and policy developments rather than an 
appraisal of the data.  
Another key problem in The Country Based Project Network Groups61 was in 
maintaining continuity; personnel move onto or are moved to other parts of the 
organisation and so there was a loss of continuity and commitment to the 
project. It was also envisaged that The Country Based Project Network Groups 
would function on their own and through using the web as a form of 
communication between members all of The Country Based Project Network 
Groups. This did not happen because there was a lack of enthusiasm from 
participants. Our view on this is that for participants they preferred co-
operation to be informal and instigated between them at their request. This 
approach is based on individual assessments of other participants, the levels of 
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trust and perceived levels of professionalism. Formalised forms of co-operation 
were viewed as bering perfunctory and not useful in an operational or 
intelligence gathering sense.  
This project had the following significant findings: 
1. There is no systemic border corruption within the project countries 
and none was reported by respondents in other member states. 
2. There was much speculation concerning the role of ‘organised crime’ 
however, the data gathered from operational law enforcement officers 
suggests that the illegal movement of people across borders is 
significantly disorganized with people making individual decisions as 
how to cross a border and accessing loose networks of association to 
engage with people who are prepared to assist. Organised 
immigration crime, although talked about, was rarely referred to in 
the terms of concrete cases but more as speculation or the 
interpretation of ‘intelligence’. This was particularly so with 
operational law enforcement personnel.  
3. There was a focus on human trafficking for sexual exploitation and 
there was a difference between the senior law enforcement personnel, 
who claimed it to be a large and significant problem, to operational 
personnel, who defined it as uncommon and suggested that much 
undocumented migration of women into the sex industry was with 
their consent.  
4. Strategies for trans-national co-operation are complex, based on trust 
and assessments of professionalism and the attempt to formalise such 
forms of co-operation are generally met with resistance as law 
enforcement personnel are keen to establish their own links. 
5. The illegal movement of people across borders needs to be located 
not only within a criminal justice framework but also one of political 
economy and migration as this will increase the level of 
understanding and provide a different theoretical framework within 
which to theorise undocumented migration. 
This project investigated corruption and organised crime in relation to 
undocumented migration within the EU. It confirmed findings from previous 
studies that had investigated similar areas. However, one significant 
contribution is that a number of questions are raised to how the problem of 
undocumented migration is constructed, particularly within law enforcement. 
This report contributes to a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the 
issues of undocumented migration and indicates that there is an alternative 
framework within which to analyse and understand the issues of crossing 
borders illegally.  
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_briefings/pb_employment/gangmasters 
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Appendix 1: Interview schedule 
Interview Schedule 
AGIS project 
 
 Define what you mean by illegal movement of people across borders, 
i.e. includes both trafficking and smuggling 
 Ask respondent, where relevant to be specific about nationalities of 
migrants/ whether there are differences between those who are 
smuggled/ trafficked. 
 
1. Background Information 
a) What is your job title? 
b) What does your job involve? 
c) What types of illegal migrants do you most commonly come across in your 
job? For example, what is their mode of entry to the country? 
 
2. Corruption 
Please consider the following definition of corruption: 
Corruption is defined as many kinds of “irregular” influence, the objective 
of which is to allow the participants to make profits they are not entitled to, 
the method being the breaking of internal or external rules. 
a) Please can you tell us your views about this definition? 
b) If respondents raises the issue of misuse of power or high/ low level 
corruption make sure they explain what they mean by this 
c) Do you think/ know that officials on the other side of the border are 
vulnerable to corruption? 
d) How do you know/ why do you think this? 
e) Have you noticed/ heard stories that persons who cross the border have 
corrupted front line staff on the other side of the border? 
f) Have you noticed/heard stories that persons who cross the border have 
corrupted agencies? 
g) How many persons with faulty/ missing/etc. travel documents arrive to 
this border control station per day? 
h) What is the usual course of action taken with the persons with the 
faulty/ missing travel documents? 
i) What happens to the documents? 
j) Do you know from speaking to those involved in the illegal movement 
of people at what stage/ stages in the process money is exchanged? 
k) Do you know how the money is exchanged?( and ask about money 
laundering) 
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l) Do you know from speaking to those involved how the process of 
illegally moving people works? 
 
3. Illegal Migration 
a) Do illegal persons tend to arrive alone or in groups to this border 
crossing station? 
b) What tends to be the origins of these persons? 
c) Do groups of people tend to be of the same ethnic grouping? 
d) Why have these people come illegally to this country? 
e) How have they tended to get here? (what is the route taken?) 
f) How long has their trip from home taken? 
g) Do you know or have experience(s) of people smuggling organisations? 
h) If you know of any, what do you know, how do they work? 
 
4. Criminal Networks 
a) Using your knowledge and experience can you say what tends to 
happen to illegal migrants when they get to the UK? 
b) Do you know of any pre-existing relationships between the illegal 
migrants and crime groups? 
c) If know of pre-existing relationships what is the nature of these 
relationships? For example, are they loose/ tight, are they short lived? 
d) Are the illegal persons that arrive into the country victims or active 
participants of criminal networks? 
e) If active participants identified, is this especially true for certain 
ethnicities/ crimes? 
f) Why/how organised crime groups send/smuggle persons to this 
 country? (why this border control station has been chosen)  
g) Have you any examples where (asylum seekers, smuggled persons, 
 travellers with faulty documents etc.) have become victims of or are 
 forced/blackmailed into taking part in criminal networks in this country 
 after they have been granted the right to stay?  
h) If criminal networks have been identified, of the criminal networks you 
 have identified what is the level of sophistication and organisation of 
 these? 
 
5. Border Co-Operation 
Formal co-operation 
a) How does border co-operation with neighbour country officials work 
with cases of asylum seekers, smuggled persons, travellers with faulty 
documents etc. on this border control station?  
b) What are the reasons to communicate or meet with neighbouring 
country officials? What intelligence is shared? 
c) What is the level of communication? 
d) Are there any special problems/ things to improve in border co-
operation/communication? 
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Informal co-operation 
a) What is the level of informal border co-operation? 
b) Under what circumstances does information tend to be shared 
informally? 
c) What forms does informal border co-operation take? 
d) Are there any tensions between formal and informal co-operation? 
e) Do you know/ had experience of any difficulties in countries having 
different definitions or interpretations of what illegal movement of 
people is? 
 
6. Border Regulation 
a) What is the structure of the border guards? For example, how many 
agencies man the border, what is the management structure of these, is 
there separate border police, what are the remits of these agencies? 
b) How well do the neighbour country border officials follow the 
national/international rules and regulations? 
c) How well do the authorities on this side of border follow the rules and 
regulations?  
d) What are the strengths and weaknesses of these rules?  
 
7. Role of EU Regulatory Frameworks in Border Controls 
a) How helpful is the current regulatory framework to your work?  
b) Where in the process are EU regulatory frameworks of particular 
help/hindrance? 
c) Can you identify any elements of the regulatory framework that hinder 
your work? 
d) What do you think needs to be improved? (Prompt: Schengen and 
Dublin Agreements if not mentioned by the respondent). 
 
8. Role and Function of Agencies 
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Appendix 2: Project meeting notes - Tallinn 
      
      
      
      
      
 
Project Meeting Tallinn: 
Detailed Programme Notes & Responsibilities. 
 
Welcome & Introductions 
(Juri & Anna) 
A welcome to all participants that thanks them for their co-operation and time 
given to our research and how the meeting in Tallinn demonstrates the 
importance of our collaborative work. It is evidence of partnership and 
collaboration between the research community and professionals in the field of 
criminal justice. AGIS funding provides an opportunity for European 
researchers and criminal justice professionals and policy makers to come 
together to share ideas and approaches to those issues that are of mutual 
concern. 
I suggest that the welcome is given by Estonia (Juri and Anna). (15 mins) 
 
Session One: 
Theme: 
Introduction of the Project and Research Themes 
(Chair: Jon) 
* Introduction of the Project 
* Identification of recurring themes in relation to illegal movement of people 
across borders 
 
Introduction to the Project: 
This session should introduce the overall scope of the project to the 
participants, its aims and objectives and the role of each country in the 
research. 
Introduction to the structure of the research 
Introduction to research methodologies – qualitative interviews 
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Introduction to Definition of Corruption – Ideas of Vulnerabilities 
Introduction to the definition of the Problem 
 
Jon– Approx 45 mins 
Establish the framework for the following discussion: 
Consider the policy issues for each country – 
- Asylum as an issue – numbers, places of origin 
- Border security – identification of threats 
- Movement of people across borders within the EU framework - 
Schengen 
- Issues of cross border co-operation – policy issues. 
 
Coffee Break 
 
Second Session: 
Theme: Corruption and documents. 
(Chair: Terhi on corruption, Mika document fraud). 
* Introduction to topic area  
* Corruption 
* Counterfeiting of documents 
 
The focus of this session is the issue of corruption – we need to introduce our 
working definition and to provide participants with an opportunity to explore 
the idea of corruption to see if we can begin to fashion a working definition if 
the view is that our current definition is not broad or specific enough. As Terhi 
sas done the outline section for the report perhaps she would be a good person 
to lead the discussion. 
Each country should report on the issue of documentation fraud and we should 
consider the potential for such fraud and the relationship to organised crime 
networks. 
A number of questions may emerge: 
How fraudulent documents are utilized by facilitators 
How fraudulent documents are circulated 
How fraudulent documents are reused 
How forgery is organised  
There may be a range of other questions that emerge from the data from each 
of the countries. We want to stimulate a debate between the participants in 
relation to future possibilities in terms of document forgery. 
66 
LUNCH 
 
Session Three; 
Theme: Crossing borders 
(Chair: Anna) 
* Introduction of topic area 
* Finnish - Russian border co-operation  
* Presentation by UK Reflex 
 
Presentations by Finnish and UK colleagues on how to combat illegal 
movement across borders. The UK response will be given by REFLEX (Laura 
Weight Home Office) and the Finnish response will focus on cross border co-
operation between Finland and Russia. It is hoped that this discussion will 
begin to highlight issues and problems in relation to effective cross border co-
operation. The issues that may emerge are; 
 Developing levels of trust between different agencies 
 Understanding constraints from each of the jurisdictions 
 Co-operation and the sharing of information 
 Formalising informal relationships 
 Protecting evidence – following proper procedures and protocols 
 Overcoming the formality of formalisation. 
 
Tea Break 
 
Session Four: 
Key policy issues and Research Direction 
(Chair: Jon) 
Aims: 
To define the key policy issues in relation to illegal movement of people across 
borders. Some possible areas are: 
 Co-operation between different agencies – how to make this more 
effective 
 Identifying legal loopholes that impede effective police work and 
prosecution 
 Understanding labour markets 
 Understanding facilitation routes 
To consider the direction of the research in phase two, the current plan is to; 
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Interview people who have been involved in facilitation cases either as 
facilitated people or as those involved in the process. There are difficulties with 
gaining access to the potential research respondents.  
The analysis of completed case files in relation to the prosecution of those 
involved in facilitation and trafficking. There is a debate to be had in relation to 
trafficking, especially in relation to other forms of trafficking other than into 
the sex industry. It will be worth exploring the structure of different types of 
labour and that of debt bondage and domestic labour. Worth also exploring 
outflows from countries and the impact of this on their economies. 
Ask participants to discuss in cross country groups for 40 minutes (three 
groups) and to bring together the main themes from their discussion to the final 
Q&A session. 
Discussion and report back 
Close 
 
Session Five 
Theme: Exploitation issues in relation to the illegal movement of people 
Roundtable discussion (Chair: Jon) 
Introduction 
Iveta Bartunkova 
IOM  
FRONTEX 
Europol 
 
Take a presentation from Iveta Bartunkova concerning migration and labour. 
Identify issues concerning the exploitation of people and their movement. 
Consider the policy issues in relation to the issues raised and how law 
enforcement is involved. Explore potential links with organised crime and how 
such organisations/networks may develop to exploit further the opportunities 
offered in relation to criminal activity. Consider the evidence from Plastic Card 
Fraud Unit. 
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Session Six 
Theme: Organized crime and criminal networks 
(Chair: Anna & Mika). 
Presentation: Different models or forms of criminal networks 
Group discussions 30 min: 
- Law enforcement implications 
- Consequences for control attempts 
- Implications for cross-border co-operation 
 
Implications for further research 
 
 
Closing Comments Jon 
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Notes: 
 
Each session will be chaired by a member of the research group. It will be their 
responsibility to manage the session and to provide an introduction to the topic 
area, bringing together the main findings from our research. 
If you need to prepare PowerPoint use the slide template – I have attached the 
beginnings of the presentation so far. 
We can finalise presentations and organisational matters at the meeting on 
Monday. 
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AGIS 
Illegal Movement of People across Borders Project 
 
Interim Project Network Meeting 
17th- 18th January 2006  
Tallinn, Estonia 
 
Tuesday 17th January 2006  
 
 Opening 
 Introductions 
 Distribution of table of attendance and contact details – database to be 
constructed by UK research team (contact Anna) 
 No objections raised to the recording of the network meeting 
 
Session One: Introduction of the Project and Research Themes 
 Introduction of research project by Jon Spencer, University of 
Manchester, UK. (Details of which to be provided, if necessary, at a 
later date) 
 Brief discussion of definitional issues and the problem of quantifying 
illegal movement of people across borders – data collection issues 
 Identification of key questions for the workshops: 
 
Group 1 workshop – Moderator Terhi Viljanen, HEUNI, Finland 
 
Measures/ indicators used to estimate the problem of illegal immigration 
 All countries argue that a true measure of illegal immigration is highly 
problematic and confusing and therefore difficult to quantify – do we 
count persons who enter illegally and persons who enter legally but 
stay after their visa has expired? 
 Finland states that exact numbers cannot be known and thus the true 
nature of illegal immigration – within Finland and Schengen – cannot 
be successfully quantified 
 Is an exact measurement of the problem required? And furthermore can 
statistics be relied upon? Statistics, by their nature, are inherently out of 
date. 
 If states are satisfied that the number of illegal immigrants is significant 
enough to quantify a problem of illegal immigration, arguably exact 
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numbers do not need to be known: only that there is a significant 
problem. Instead of using resources to refine whether the true figure of 
illegal immigration is, say, 5% not 3%, perhaps it would be more 
economical and prudent to use such resources to tackle the 3% problem. 
 Need to define what is meant by ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘legal 
migration resulting in illegal immigration’ as such definitions can 
directly affect official statistics. Examples; Estonian official illegal 
immigration statistics rising from 100-200 in 2004 to 2,000 in ??? 
[2005- unclear on recording]; UK and trafficking definitions; Irish 
Common Transport Area and illegal immigration – there is no clear 
understanding of how many people legally enter Ireland and then leave 
immediately, or instead illegally travel to the UK.  
 Need to look to other indicators: crime figures; Europeans in the sex 
industry; social indicators – and hence when such indictors (not 
statistics) become problematic and indicative of a problem with illegal 
immigration. Case of the Chinese cockle-pickers in the UK – whilst 
there are no specific statistics or measurements of the number of 
Chinese illegal immigrants in the UK, the Morecambe Bay case clearly 
indicates that Chinese people are entering the UK and being exploited 
 Number of refusals as an indicator – reveals a permanent pressure on 
the border and constant need for border guards to check documents 
 
Indications of secure border 
 Irish border as problematic – destination or transit country or both? 
Problematic issue of the vulnerability of the common transport area. 
 UK highlighted three issues concerning secure borders:  
- Systematic corruption at borders by border guards 
- Vulnerable points at borders abused by facilitators. For example, 
Estonia states that the Russian-Estonian border was found to be vulnerable 
at 5am as guards were less alert, and the UK states that 4pm is a 
particularly vulnerable time as guards are less alert and there are less staff: 
- Such findings do not indicate corruption but highlight vulnerabilities 
which can be abused – good times to move people (requires increased 
resources) 
- EU membership impact on borders: Baltic States to Estonian; 
movement Ireland and then onto the UK via Common Travel Area. Issue of 
‘legitimately porous’ border points not corruption per se – once access is 
gained to EU, Schengen agreement allows free movement  
 Number of refusals at the border is an indication of secure borders: 
highlights that border guards are active, engaged in their work, carrying 
out the necessary checks 
 Strengthening of borders? Increase the number of border guards; 
Technology; chance? Directly linked to the amount that States are 
willing to pay to strengthen and improve policing of their borders. A 
significant increase in the number of border guards (1000 extra) hired 
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by the Spanish authorities to control the Ceuta-Milia border did not, 
however, prevent the flow of illegal immigration. 
 Finland argues that instead of improving border security as such, States 
need to control the flow and direction of illegal immigration in an 
attempt to curb the problem 
 UK states that there is no such thing as a safe border; there are degrees 
of secureness but it is directly linked to how much states are willing to 
pay. Perhaps need to look towards improving/ resolving other measures 
and indicators within the destination country – measures to compliment 
border security 
 
Reliability of these measures/ statistics 
 Statistics, by their nature, are inherently out of date. 
 Finland argued that whilst illegal immigration can be considered a 
problem in Finland, the true extent is unclear given that there is 
uncertainty around the status of the country as a destination or transit 
point; in 2003/ 2004 15 young Chinese men (illegal immigrants) died in 
Finland in a case which the authorities linked to organised crime. It is 
not known, however, whether Finland was the destination point or a 
transit county; and the manner in which in the country is defined affects 
illegal immigration statistics. 
 In the UK statistics are affected by instances of ‘multiple bulk-buying 
trips’: people bulk-buy border crossing trips (e.g. 6 trips) to ensure that 
they eventually make it across the border. Instances of Chinese illegal 
immigrants, for example, being sponsored to enter the UK – they are 
willing to take high risks, attempt to cross multiple times, stay in 
cramped safe-houses, and thus it can often take up to 12 months to 
make it into the UK. Statistics do not, however, indicate that the same 
person may have had five failed border crossing attempts before they 
successfully illegally enter the UK 
 
The impact of EU membership on illegal immigration 
 EU membership impact on borders: Baltic States to Estonian; Travel to 
Ireland and then onto the UK. Issue of porous border points not 
corruption per se – once access is gained to EU, Schengen agreement 
allows free movement 
 Imperative that EU States cooperate 
 Argued that EU document checks are more stringent and thus there is 
increasing evidence of fraudulent documents from the Baltic states 
being used for travel into the EU 
 
Positive impact of joining Schengen on illegal immigration 
 Finland argues that joining Schengen has had no effect on illegal 
immigration 
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Negative impact of joining Schengen on illegal immigration 
[Non-stated on tape. See below and summary] 
 
Group 2 workshop- Moderator Mika Junninen, HEUNI, Finland [Emily 
to provide details of session] 
 
Measures/ Indicators used to estimate the problem of illegal immigration 
 UK – it is hard to measure the flows of people into the country and the 
stock of those that are in the country – there is no sound methodology 
yet that would stand up to scrutiny. People in department been trying to 
look at available data such as the numbers found entering clandestinely 
and the number of asylum claims and trying to take out the element that 
they think makes it illegal entry but it proves very difficult. 
 Estonia – If you compare Estonia to the UK then the problem of illegal 
immigration is almost non-existent but if you compare the geographical 
size of the country and the population then there is a problem. There is 
not enough research on illegal immigration in Estonia, therefore the 
numbers are unknown. Especially if we consider the last year the border 
controls between Estonia and EU countries have become more flexible, 
there is no comparable statistical data pre and post joining the EU. 
There is less control at the borders since Estonia joined EU, EU citizens 
are not checked as thoroughly. 
 Finland – It has to be admitted that there is a gap between the truth and 
what the statistics tell us, however people are unsure as to how big this 
gap is. It is not important what statistics show but important what they 
do not include. Have to compare different sources of information, 
official statistics are only one source, other sources are needed such as 
information from neighbouring countries.  
 Situation in Finland similar to the situation in Estonia, it may be even 
calmer when regarding illegal immigration from outside the EU to 
Finland and that is maybe why Finland can handle the situation easily. 
Finland has only a few incidents, Finland knows of the phenomena of 
illegal immigration but only had a few cases so the problem is not so 
big so far.  
 
Legal/ Illegal entry 
 Estonia – When talking of illegal immigration we can also consider 
those that enter a country legally but work illegally. For example, 
people from Estonia enter the UK legally but do not fill in forms to 
work and therefore work there illegally. Therefore this is the issue of 
how much obey regulations e.g. to register work. In Estonia foreigners 
have to register that they live or work in Estonia. In the UK there is 
workers registration in place.  
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 UK – It depends on what you are trying to measure and why as to 
whether illegal entry but staying on/ working illegally should be 
included in the illegal immigrant population 
 UK – Those who enter legally but stay illegally is hard to measure 
especially in the UK as those that are leaving are not monitored 
(embarkation is not recorded). If it was then we might be able to look 
at the gaps in statistics between people coming in and people coming 
out. 
 UK – Visa abuse is a common problem. In the UK there are a high 
number of visa applications. Clandestine entry is difficult to measure 
due to the nature of it. The numbers using falsified documents is also 
hard to measure, they are hard to detect if they are of a high quality.  
 Finland – Statistics show that statistics are small numbers, the total 
numbers crossing the borders is about 15 million people, of these less 
than 2000 are denied entry. The figure of those with forged documents 
is less than 200.  
 Finland – Focus of illegal immigration of those coming from outside 
the EU, but there may be problems with those coming from within the 
EU 
 
Diverse communities 
 Estonia – Can see on the streets that the problems of illegal 
immigration from Asian and African countries is non-existent 
 Estonia – There is a difficulty around Russians who may cross 
legally and overstay (need visa to visit) therefore are in the country 
illegally as it is difficult to identify them and therefore statistics are 
not reliable. Russians with no passport or with a Russian passport 
can live in Estonia for years and no one will notice unless they 
apply for social benefits. There are a high number working illegally 
with no contracts and not paying taxes. It is not a problem for someone 
to find work if they are in Estonia illegally. 
 Estonia – Centre for Illegal immigrants – holds 10 to 20 people, these 
are mainly from Russia and not from a diverse range of countries across 
the world e.g. China 
 UK – One way to measure illegal immigration is to go into ethnic 
communities in the UK and ask them to estimate the numbers 
within that community that are there illegally. It is common for 
people to move into established communities and then go unnoticed 
(Albanians). If people don’t claim asylum can move into existing 
communities and go undetected.  
 UK – If we consider the number of foreign born people in the UK this 
gives us an idea of the potential ‘pull’ factors attracting people to the 
UK. There is no reliable data on how many of these are illegal but if 
people worked closely with communities then we might be able to find 
out and it might be interesting. 
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 Finland – Problems are limited with illegal immigration. For example 
200 people were found with forged documents but we know that there 
will be more, we can only know the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
figures. Can almost rely on statistics but have to keep some sort of 
doubt. 
 
Impact of EU membership on Illegal Immigration 
 Estonia – don’t have pre and post EU statistics on illegal immigration. 
Currently Estonia is preparing to enter Schengen – think it will have a 
positive effect on illegal immigration as will have access to information 
systems and stricter border controls. 
 Finland – Membership of EU affects border work. With regard to 
Schengen it can only be as good as its weakest point. The security of 
Schengen depends on the level of border security; it doesn’t matter 
if 90% of countries take good care of their borders if 10% do not. 
There is a benefit of being part of Schengen but at the same time there 
are risks as there are problems for example, in the Mediterranean area. 
 You cannot only look at Schengen from an economic/ political point 
of view. There is also the point of view that it is beneficial for 
tourists. 
 UK – Not sure about the impact of EU but illegal immigration from 
Russia through the Baltic states is one route the UK come across, 
however it is unclear whether this has increased with Estonia joining 
the EU 
 UK – There has been an increase in trafficking from within the EU 
which isn’t illegal immigration exactly – it is legal movement but 
with exploitation at the end. The UK were surprised by this, 
expected that people that exploit others would lose some of their 
hold over them because they are able to move freely so why employ 
a facilitator. Since accession states joined EU seen increase in 
trafficking from Lithuania. 
 UK – The UK is outside Schengen area and when deciding this there 
was a balancing act between the advantages of maintaining our own 
border and the disadvantage that the UK is not privy to all the 
information including data on 3rd country nationals in the Schengen 
area as we did not opt into that part of Schengen.  
 UK – There has not been much impact on tourism and the economy 
from being outside Schengen. 
 UK – Unsure of what political impression it gives that the UK are 
outside Schengen. The UK did not join so it could keep independent 
control of its borders, as the UK is an island it is more vulnerable. It is 
expected that the UK will stay opted out of Schengen. 
 UK – The UK does enter into agreements such as with Ireland and the 
Common Travel Area which is a bi-lateral agreement. The UK also has 
strong relationships with its nearest EU countries (Belgium and 
France). There are also measures to strengthen borders such as 
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juxtapose controls where the external border has been exported to 
France so people meet the immigration officers at Calais rather than in 
the UK which has mutual benefits. 
 Estonia – Estonia is hoping to join Schengen and the expectations of 
Schengen are high concerning illegal immigration. Sharing common 
information systems will help and will have a positive impact on illegal 
immigration from countries outside Schengen. 
 Finland – The big advantage of Schengen is the (Suisse?) System which 
is a positive for law enforcement authorities. But the big problem is 
whether border security systems are secure in all areas of Schengen, 
based on our reliable statistics 60-70% of asylum seekers that are in 
Finland are so called Dublin cases, therefore asylum tourism within EU. 
 Finland – Advice to Estonia – being a new Schengen country may 
make it more interesting and therefore popular as a transit 
country. In Finland when it joined Schengen the amount of illegal 
immigration rose then fell therefore new countries/ routes become 
interesting as transit countries. 
 Estonia – Importance of Schengen for tourists. 
 Finland – A negative of Schengen is that whilst tourists can move more 
easily within Schengen countries so can crime groups as border checks 
between countries are non-existent. 
 UK – Prices can be an important measure. For example measuring 
the costs of documents or of certain parts of the journey can give an 
indication of whether illegal immigration is falling or rising.  
 
Group 3 workshop- Moderator Anna Markina, University of Tartu, 
Estonia 
 
Measures/ indicators used to estimate the problem of illegal immigration 
 Broadly agreed by all countries that it is difficult to estimate the volume 
in numbers of illegal immigration. Commented by Estonia that the issue 
is highly (over-)politicised. 
 Finland argues that in the last few months there have been no cases of 
illegal immigration from Estonia to Finland facilitated by organised 
crime; organised crime is not, therefore, perceived to be an indicator 
used to estimate the problem of illegal immigration. 
 Need to analyse criminal networks in destination countries – argued 
that 70 - 80% of illegal immigrants arriving in the UK have used the 
services of criminal groups.  
 Suggested that illegal immigration in the UK is further linked to 
terrorism and immigrant communities. Not cited as an issue in Estonia 
and Finland– issue of visibility –‘fitting in’ and ‘standing out’.  
 Number of asylum claims – although contentious (see below) 
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Indications of secure border 
 UK stated that the issue of secure borders is perceived to be a 
destination-country problem (UK and Northern European problem); 
source and transit countries do not perceive the issue of border security 
to be problematic – ethos of ‘not our problem’. UK commented that 
there is a need to not only address border security but also ‘pull’ factors 
in destination countries: for example, immigrant communities; ex-pat 
communities 
 Finland argued that the issue of secure borders is not a major issue 
inside and outside of Schengen. Commented that whilst the fall of the 
Soviet Union once posed a threat, Russian authorities now have good 
control of their own borders. Mentioned that there is good cooperation 
between Finland and Russia. 
 Estonia commented that illegal immigration is highly problematic (and 
highly politicised) because of the fact that Estonia borders with Russia 
(mentioned that there is also criminal network involvement). 
 Argued that cooperation amongst countries and authorities is 
fundamental 
 Illegal immigration is not necessarily linked to secure borders – concept 
of the border being more than just the line on the ground. 
 Increasing instances of legal border crossings but illegal stays or illegal 
working in destination countries 
 
Reliability of these measures/ statistics 
 UK stated that an underestimation of the measurement of illegal 
immigration can allow for the formation of well-established criminal 
groups 
 Issue of Asylum: in 1999 there were approx 3,000 asylum applications 
per month at Dover; in Dec 2005, 120 applications for asylum were 
claimed at Dover. Why the significant fall? UK argues that it is now the 
case that persons do not claim asylum immediately at the port. Instead, 
illegal immigrants first seek to work illegally in the Black market; it is 
only when they are caught that they attempt to go through the Asylum 
process. The result is a distorting of the statistics.  
 Need to be actively aware of the impact oflegal movement of persons 
across borders and the effect upon illegal immigration statistics – 
Estonia comments that a problem they experience is persons legally 
crossing the Russian/ Estonian border then remaining in the country 
illegally. 
 Need to also therefore include the dispersion of ‘disappearing’ legal and 
illegal immigrants in countries in the statistics/ be aware of this ‘dark 
figure’.  
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The impact of EU membership on illegal immigration 
 Estonia do not anticipate any problems; argue that the Estonian/ 
Russian border is not a major concern [Contradicts previous comment]. 
 
Positive impact of joining Schengen on illegal immigration 
 Operational benefits: unified standards; Unified Schengen monitoring 
system to track the movement of a person around Europe; cooperation 
amongst authorities 
 
Negative impact of joining Schengen on illegal immigration 
 UK stated Turkish case – movement from Turkey to Greece to UK 
UK immigration officers visited a detention centre in Greece; two 
weeks later a detainee from the Greek detention centre arrived in the 
UK in the back of a van with papers signed by a guard at the centre. 
Movement through the Schengen countries would have been by train. 
 UK argue that the impact of joining Schengen would be very 
problematic – Eg: Russians travelling on Lithuanian passports 
(deception). 
 Joining Schengen is not a feasible issue for the UK as illegal 
immigration is too politicized – would be political suicide 
 
Roundtable Discussion 
 Very difficult to quantify (or even estimate) the problem with any 
reliability  
 Issue around whether we need to quantify the problem of illegal 
immigration since there are other factors: levels of crime/ criminality; 
levels of vice; terrorism; asylum claims (NB: reliability issues – sudden 
decrease in UK) 
 Immigration concluded to not necessarily be a problem of secure 
borders: movement is often legal but persons stay illegally – instances 
are on the increase 
 Issues of vulnerability of states and the social composition and 
historical background of states – An increasing vulnerability in the UK, 
for example, is the ‘pull factor’ of immigrant communities 
 Definitional issues around ‘illegal immigration’ – there is an increasing 
need to include legal immigration (- illegal stay) within the debate. Also 
ties in with debate around when is trafficking to be defined as 
trafficking (often the case that the movement across the border is a legal 
movement). 
 Exploitation often occurs within and by homogeneous communities; 
highlighting a direct link between illegal immigration and ex-pat or 
immigrant community settlement within a destination country. Example 
of Polish persons legally entering the UK to work but then being 
exploited by members of their own community, or Albanian women 
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being exploited in the sex industry by members of their own 
community 
 Agreement that illegal immigration is becoming increasingly politicised 
 Summary of Schengen debate (see above for further details): a complex 
mix 
Positives:  
- Unified common system, protocols and rules 
- More effective control within an integrated system 
- Allows free movement for employment, leisure… 
Negatives: 
- Enables free movement of criminal gangs and provides 
opportunities to exploit the system and further make contacts 
- Lack of document checks 
 Agreement that there will always be many points of vulnerability at 
borders; and whilst states can try and overcome such vulnerabilities 
persons and criminal groups will always seek alternative means – 
unless there is a significant amount of finance spent on securing borders 
 
Session Two: Corruption and Document Fraud 
 
Corruption, Chair: Terhi Viljanen, HEUNI, Finland 
 Brief explanation of definitional issues – no UN definition of 
corruption. Statement of working definition of corruption 
 
The Vulnerabilities to Corruption 
 Finland among the least of corrupted countries 
Why? High moral standards of Finnish civil servants; transparency of 
society and State institutions 
 Corruption amongst officials related to problems of social securance: an 
individual’s perception of the organisation that they belong to and the 
loyalties that they hold 
 Banal issue – low salaries of border guards is cited as a vulnerability; 
Finns comment that increased salaries are needed 
 Issue of weak points within the system 
 In UK, issue of eliminating risk 
 EU accession States may experience problems implementing EU 
procedures – need to gain ‘know-how’. Joining of Schengen carries the 
risk that it may cause a sense of insecurity amongst border guard 
officials – threat of negative consequential effects with regard to 
corruption 
 In Estonia, monetary ‘goods’ are perceived to weak points for 
corruption, not the illegal movement of people [what about the 
increasing debate around the commodification of people and illegal 
immigration? Would this be a vulnerability for Estonia?] 
80 
 Europol state that corruption is a method used by organised criminal 
groups to achieve their goals – again, stated that corruption and illegal 
immigration in Estonia is not perceived to be an issue 
 
The Protective Measures against Corruption 
 Multi-agency cooperation  
 Higher salaries for border guards and officials 
 Improve morale amongst border guards and officials 
 Eliminate the risks: eliminate vulnerable hours of the day at borders 
 
Incidents of Corruption 
 No significant findings from Finnish research – instances of minor 
bribery by foreigners. For example, the giving of champagne and 
chocolates to visa officials by Russians – linked to differences in 
administration; Social and cultural norms; Bribery? 
 UK – Isolated cases of corruption and therefore no evidence of 
systematic corruption – difficult to hide corruption within such a 
community; Issues of ‘points of corruption’ and vulnerabilities beyond 
the border: visa issuing; passport officers. Concluded that corrupt 
means are only used if needed: facilitators primarily exploit options that 
incur minimal costs, minimal risks  
 UK – Some evidence of links between border control officials and 
criminality (may increase in 10- 15 years?) 
 Russian corruption amongst custom officers, passport control at 
Moscow – where illegal immigrants are informed as to which desk to 
go to (no stated cases amongst border guards): need to perhaps question 
those crossing the borders. Baltic Sea Task Force highlights evidence of 
some degree of corruption – official leaks. Reinstates comment that 
corruption can occur beyond the border line on the ground 
 In Estonia, where cases of corruption have been found, linked to 
economics; corruption was, therefore, not found to be of great 
importance (very small number of cases). Some cases of local authority 
corruption with regards to citizenship exams and the falsifying of 
results to enable the issuing of passports 
 IOM state that there is no systematic evidence of border guard 
corruption in Estonia although there is some evidence of border guard 
corruption 
 
The reliability of message about [absence of] corruption 
 Perception that corruption occurs in Russia 
 Politically fuelled debate 
 Issues of trust and saving face (ie: States are often unwilling to reveal 
that they have a problem with corruption) 
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Corruption as an ‘External’ issue 
 Generally perceived as a Russian problem 
 Corruption in the source country, but very rarely (perceived to be) in 
the transit or destination country 
Document Fraud. Chair: Mika Junninen, HEUNI, Finland 
 Finland found that the majority of forged passports originated from 
Lithuania and Thailand, whilst falsified documents (stamps on visas 
and passports) came from Russia. Finns found that 150 each year are 
found using fraudulent documents. In 2003 there were 13 examples of 
fraudulent document use, rising to 400 cases in 2004. Why? Increased 
knowledge and education cited as explanatory factors. Argued that the 
number of false documents in Finland is a problem. 
 Commented that the Russian system is confusing as there are two 
means of gaining documents: Ministry of Interior and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Arguably increases opportunities for corruption. 
 Moscow- Finland was a popular route used by illegal immigrants but 
increased intelligence amongst Finnish border guards has managed to 
curb the flow 
 Discussion around Schengen and document fraud: the requirement that 
Schengen States grant visas to all those that are eligible has proved 
problematic with regard to the extending of visas. If, for example, a 
person applies for lengthened stay in Finland they are then prevented 
from obtaining a second visa; under Schengen, however, the person 
involved is entitled to obtain a visa from another Schengen country and 
then freely travel back into Finland. 
 Estonia found some evidence of Estonian forged documents and 
Estonian passports being used in the UK, however the main issue is the 
problem of ‘identity theft’ and the use of stolen passports. There is also 
an issue around falsified documents in that Estonian citizenship status is 
granted illegitimately yet the person involved is then (deceivingly) 
eligible to obtain a legal passport that they would otherwise not be 
entitled to. 
 Commented that Estonia is a transit point and the majority of falsified 
documents that pass through are either Lithuanian or GB. 
 UK found evidence of high quality forgeries of varying nationalities 
produced using advanced technologies and linked to organised crime 
groups; such documents are difficult to detect, requiring highly skilled 
intelligence officers. The largest increase in the UK has been the 
Lithuanian parcel of fraudulent documents 
 Cases in the UK of impostors using genuine documents in a fraudulent 
manner: identity theft 
 Evidence of the re-using of documents by criminal networks, indicating 
that different criminal networks communicate with each other and 
across borders 
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Group One Workshop: Moderator Jon Spencer [Emily to provided notes] 
 
Group Two Workshop: Moderator Anna Markina 
Organization of the forgery 
 Discussion around why there is a high number of Lithuanian forged 
documents – began with the small-scale production of fraudulent Euros 
leading to high-scale organised crime led production of Euros in 
Lithuania. The authorities gained intelligence and production was 
dismantled; knowledge of how to counterfeit goods, however, remained 
and thus production shifted towards the counterfeiting of passports. An 
example of how organised criminal groups exploit vulnerabilities in the 
system. 
 One high-profile case in 2004 of large-scale production of fraudulent 
documents in Estonia – the scheme was short-term, being dismantled 
after an intelligence-led operation 
 Work is being carried out in the UK to limit the use of fraudulent 
stamps 
 Element of international organised criminal group cooperation – 
networks – with regard to the production of fraudulent documents for 
terrorists; highlighting a need for international intelligence cooperation 
 Evidence of sophisticated networks and high-scale production – 
‘entrepreneurs’ 
 The internet has proved a useful tool in the organisation of the forgeries 
 
Countries from which the forged documents originate 
 Lithuania (see above) – linked in with the issue of ‘profiles’: Russians, 
for example, can easily adopt the profile of a Lithuanian or Estonian 
and successfully manage to deceive UK border guards due to the 
similarities i.e. a UK border guard is arguably not able to tell the 
difference in appearance 
 Russian forgeries are generally high quality 
 Thailand is a main producer of fraudulent documents 
 Discussion around Schengen State passports – argued that some 
passports are easier to forge than others; cautioned that the accession 
States joining of Schengen may result in weaknesses in the system 
wherein a situation arises which results in the forging of the weakest 
Schengen passports to facilitate free movement around the EU 
 UK forged passports are generally uncommon as Schengen State 
documents are more useful with regard to free movement 
 
Circulation of the fraudulent documents 
 In the UK the issue of forged documents is more problematic due to 
language differences and a lack of ability to differentiate between Baltic 
State passports and Central Eastern European passports 
 83
 Highlighted that there is a high turnaround of Baltic State border guards 
and thus there is an issue around knowledge and State intelligence and 
the ability to identify fraudulent documents – results in broad 
circulation of documents 
 Findings from Estonia highlight cases of forged documents passing 
through several borders (Lithuania, Latvia…) before being detected in 
Estonia (NB: could also indicate the illegitimate stamping of documents 
at such borders) 
 There is a need for an international border control system 
 
Utilization of the fraudulent documents by facilitators 
 Common usage by facilitators in trafficking and smuggling cases as the 
illegal immigrant is commodified 
 
Re-use of fraudulent documents 
 Traffickers often reuse documents and are a source for the reusing of 
documents 
 Cases of whole families using the same, single passport to cross borders 
because border guards are not able to translate the details on the 
documents 
 
Market for fraudulent documents 
 In the UK the weakest point is identity fraud 
 In the UK, the cost of a genuine or high-quality forged passport can be 
anything from £3,000–5,000; there is a particular market for lost or 
stolen passports 
 Evidence of a small market in the illegal use of residency permits, 
however, the risk factor is greater as forgeries are often of poor quality 
 Terhi mentioned something about a market in Russian visas – to obtain 
documentation a HIV test has to be taken to prove that you are not 
HIV+ and this has resulted in a market for fraudulent documents [I 
need to get her to clarify] 
 There is no structured market for Russian passports in the UK as an 
individual is still required to have a work permit 
 The internet has proved a useful tool in the market for fraudulent 
documents in that it has made obtaining such documentation easier for 
the individual or facilitator 
 There is an area of land in Estonia that has historically fallen between 
the Russian and Estonian territories; Estonian authorities recently 
declared that all individuals who have lived or have had significant 
family ties in the area since the 1950s are eligible for an Estonian 
passport. Since Estonian passports are more favourable, this has led to 
high amount of illegitimate claims and fraudulent use of documents 
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 In Finland the Ingerman area has created a market for the need of 
fraudulent documents: Ingerman lies south of the Russia-Finland 
border, was part of the Swedish-Finnish kingdom and taken over by 
Russia in 1809, and is now part of Russia. In 1991 its citizens with a 
Finnish origin were granted the right to Finnish citizenship. This has 
led to an increase in fraudulent Finnish documents 
 
Roundtable Discussion 
 Reiterated that Lithuanian forgers have skilled mechanisms in place 
 Agreed that the ‘recycling’ of documents is an issue 
 Nigerian passports in the UK are perceived to be a big issue [CPS case] 
 Schengen weakness: forgers have 25 passports to chose from, and the 
most vulnerable will get forged 
 Agreed that since the increase of the internet the market for fraudulent 
documents is global and open to everyone 
 Organised traffickers heavily rely upon fraudulent documents 
 The price of documents varies dramatically depending upon quality, 
usefulness, demand – Nigerian documents, for example, are relatively 
worthless whilst good UK and Lithuanian passports can cost £1000’s. 
NB: a good passport can enable the illegal immigrant to access a whole 
host of other social and welfare services in the destination country 
 There is an issue of forged residency permits 
 Commented that there are localised forms of production (with varying 
levels of professionalism and sophistication) and fluid organised crime 
networks that take advantage of the Internet. Trafficking groups are 
perceived to use their own production means, very rarely having access 
to external criminal groups 
 Similarities around the trafficking and smuggling of freight and the 
trafficking and smuggling of persons – the commodification of illegal 
immigration 
 There is no system in place that allows Europol to exchange 
information with Russia and there is hence no opportunity to exchange 
intelligence 
 Issue of double-invoicing 
 
Session Three. Crossing Borders 
Chair Anna Markina, Institute of Law, University of Tartu, Estonia 
 Identification of several patterns in crossing borders for illegal stay: 
- Facilitation by criminal networks for gain: Smuggling 
- Trafficking of people by organised crime groups for gain: 
sexual exploitation; agriculture 
- Movement of people for reason of kinship and community 
 Need to distinguish between crossing borders and organised crime: the 
two do not necessarily go hand-in-hand 
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 In the UK, attempts to understand the structure of networks – use of 
trafficking strategies. Evidence of close-knit strategies and connective 
networks, moving of people along a chain that is protected from 
beginning to end; commodification of people as valuable goods that 
need protecting down the chain 
 Further evidence of looser networks where facilitation is assistance out 
of a kinship or ex-pat community loyalty 
 In Finland, there are 30 border crossing points, with common routes 
being from Asia- Russia – Finland; Africa- Finland 
 The crossing of borders in Finland is largely by groups – not 
individuals – with a ‘tour-leader’. In cases of facilitation for sexual 
exploitation the movement chain is tightly protected and guarded 
 Finnish research is unclear as to the links with organised crime (in 2004 
there were 3- 5 suspected cases of facilitation by organised crime) 
 
Presentation by Laura Weight, REFLEX, Home Office, UK 
 REFLEX it is a multi-agency taskforce (Government, law enforcement, 
CPS, immigration, security, foreign office) that aims to combat 
organised immigration crime through: Prevention; police-led 
intelligence operations; Enforcement 
 Emerged in response to the case in 2000 where 58 Chinese nationals 
were found to have died in the back of a lorry whilst attempting to 
smuggle through Dover; the case was not perceived to be opportunistic 
but linked to organised crime and thus required a formal response 
 In 2004/2005 there were 343 REFLEX funded teams in the UK that 
successfully disrupted 150 organised crime groups, made 1,500 arrests, 
and seized £5.5m 
 REFLEX has a network of liaison officers in key transit areas and 
capacity building in the Baltic States.  
 Distinguish between general abuse and organised immigration crime; 
not concerned with opportunistic illegal immigration 
 The UK is aligned to a model of harm: facilitators who cause ham and 
exploit individuals 
 UK is a destination country – there are high number of asylum claims 
due to the high number of diasporas in the UK 
 Two main methods of entry: Clandestine entry falsified documents 
 Some success in securing borders: juxtapose controls in France and 
Belgium; increased use of new detection methods such as heart-beat 
monitors and heat detectors 
 Whilst there has been an increase in the UK in the trafficking of 
persons (normally by air, using false documents, and from the Baltic 
States or the far-east), the majority of movement is facilitated illegal 
immigration of Indians, Iraqis, Somalis and Iranians.  
 Cost varies considerably from next to nothing to £20,000 and is route/ 
length dependent 
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 Evidence of a cohesive structure of facilitation from China 
 Routes into UK: Ukraine – Poland – EU – UK; North Africa – EU – 
UK; Turkey – Balkans – Italy. If false documentation is being used the 
routes are endless 
 Current research: people convicted of trafficking/ facilitation; 
measurement of the market and the economic impact; smuggling and 
‘harm’ [mention of unpublished stats re: cost to system] 
 Kent REFLEX: In the 1990s the UK was not resourced to deal with 
organised crime. The Dover case in 2000 highlighted [– arguably too 
late –] the need to understand the link between organised crime and 
criminality 
 Prior to REFLEX there was also no multi-agency response; wasting of 
resources; mistrust and suspicion (– years of mistrust and suspicion 
have had to be broken down) 
 Trafficking [facilitation for gain] is now defined as a national policing 
problem, and there have been 27 successful or on-going trafficking-
related prosecutions (highest sentence being 21 years). Sentencing is 
reflective of the severity of organised crime 
 Partnership is highlighted as the key to success; States cannot move 
forwards without a multi-agency approach 
 Some resistance with regard to foreign support and assistance 
 In the UK, as stated, illegal immigration is often linked to Diaspora 
settlement and thus there is a need for formal cooperation with 
authorities in sending countries 
 SOCA to go live on 1st April: the bringing together of all agencies  
 
Roundtable Discussion 
 Similar multi-agency cooperation in Finland and Estonia 
 FRONTEX argue that it is difficult to find a formula to deal with the 
many faces of illegal immigration 
 Further discussion on the limitations of statistics and the need for the 
use of other social indicators 
 
Session Four. Key policy issues and issues of cooperation 
Chair. Terhi Viljanen, HEUNI, Finland 
 On the issue of cooperation, Finland has signed two bilateral crime 
prevention agreements: Finland- Estonia; Finland- Russia  
 
Finnish- Russian Border Cooperation Presentation by Olli Lampinen, The 
Border Guard, Finland 
 Presentation on Police- Customs- Border Guard (PCB) co-operation in 
Finland [NB: If needed, Sarah to Email to ask for presentation] 
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 Aim is to increase cooperation at the national, regional and local level 
and to prevent and combat organised crime; monitoring of the import 
and export of freight and the illegal movement of people 
 Focus on implementation; cooperation at border crossing points; 
exchange of information; risk-analysis and intelligence; joint High 
Impact Operations (HIOs); Crime investigation groups 
 Strong juridical input 
 National and international overlaps with regards to cooperation [three 
circle overlapping diagram with the shared overlap in the middle 
representing the joint area of databases and information-sharing 
 International cooperation with Russia, Estonia, Baltic States – tripartite 
agreement and the Baltic Sea Taskforce 
 PCB works within an EU framework 
 A national plan of Internal Security and the PCB Act 
 The initial agreement of Finnish- Russian cooperation was made during 
Soviet times and revised in the mid-1990s.  
- Comprised of: Executive level; permanent Finnish-Russian 
border guard working group; Regional border guard delegates; 
border delegate assistants; Heads of PCBs; experts 
- Functions very well 
 Concluded that all States may have their own exclusive areas that they 
need to focus on with regard to illegal immigration but there are also 
areas that all States must work together on 
 
Roundtable Discussion 
Policy level of cooperation 
 Best-practice agreements between Schengen States 
 
Operational level of cooperation 
 Intelligence centres in Finland (similar to NCIS) that focus intelligence-
gathering between organisations 
 Baltic Sea Task Force: multi-country (Baltic, Scandinavia, Poland, 
Germany) and multi-agency (Europol, Interpol) approach to combat 
organised crime within the Baltic 
- Works on three levels: Task-Force meetings; Operative 
Committee; Expert sub-groups. 
-  Modus-operandi: meetings; seminars; training; information 
exchange; joint-investigation groups; analysis 
- Aim is to facilitate relationships with a variety of different 
organisations 
 Estonian inter-agency cooperation and the bilateral agreement between 
Estonia and Finland has proved very productive and invaluable 
 The common Schengen database is leading the way in promoting high 
levels of intelligence sharing 
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Developing levels of trust between different agencies (cooperation is about 
intelligence sharing) 
 Estonian law enforcement authorities and custom officials use one 
common intelligence database; difficult to achieve but functions well 
and highly fruitful, showing good results 
 REFLEX – barriers and obstacles: information sharing; divisions. 
Recognition of such issues fuelled the need for the formation of one 
organised crime agency – SOCA 
 Debate in the UK as to whether there is a need for one UK border 
agency, amalgamating Special branch, border guards etc… Such a 
single organisation would possibly prevent the identified problem of 
repeat question of illegal immigrants by each authority they encounter  
 FRONTEX cooperates on many levels and the production of clear 
working methods and a positive working culture has facilitated mutual 
trust amongst agencies 
 In Finland single authorities control the borders; the main issue around 
increased cooperation is not that there are too few organisations but that 
there is the fear that amalgamation could result in the decrease of 
expertise in certain areas (Trust issues with regards to the expertise of 
other organisations) 
 
 
CLOSE 
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AGIS 
Illegal Movement of People across Borders Project 
 
Interim Project Network Meeting 
17th- 18th January 2006  
Tallinn, Estonia 
 
Wednesday 18th January 2006  
 
 Opening 
 No objections raised to the recording of the network meeting 
 Two core issues underpinning discussion: migration and labour; 
organised crime and networks 
 
Session Five. Exploitation issues in relation to the illegal movement of 
people 
 
Presentation on Labour and Migration by Iveta Bartunkova, Independent 
Consultant 
 Previous work with Anti-Slavery International: identification of 
trafficked persons; link between forced labour and trafficking 
 Brief discussion on UN Trafficking Protocol 
 Difficult to estimate the magnitude of the problem 
 Women and children exploited within the sex industry 
 Since the UN Convention and supplementary Protocols, little 
discussion on the exploitation of males and exploitation in sectors other 
than the sex industry. Identified as an area where there is not sufficient 
understanding 
 Interviews with organisations have led to an understanding that there is 
not a single issue but a variety of themes: movement; coercion; real 
options for trafficked persons 
 Irregular migration is closely link to exploitation – complex issues. 
Need to analyse the construction of the debate 
- Increasing body of evidence stating that migrants often agree to 
be assisted therefore indicating facilitation not trafficking BUT, 
are not informed that they will be partaking in illegal forms of 
labour therefore indicating deception.  
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- Increasing evidence of legal entry with legal documents, but 
intimidated and forced into exploitation; Many facilitated 
migrants find themselves debt-bonded and are forced to work 
illegally to pay off their debts [lack of free will] 
- Increasing evidence of exploitation of EU Accession State 
citizens- such individuals are not classed as illegal immigrants 
but they are exploited in being forced to supply the black 
economy in the UK 
- Asylum seekers often need to supplement the State benefits they 
receive with exploitative forms of labour 
 As the above cases highlight, there is a multifaceted link between 
irregular migration and exploitative labour; If illegal immigration can 
be successfully tackled there will be a direct consequential effect upon 
exploitative labour practices in destination countries 
 Research implications: need to understand the link between migration 
and forced labour; need greater understanding of coercion – mentioned 
by the UN Protocol but the definition is problematic with regards to 
forced labour 
 Victims and definitional problems: gender-constructions; genuine/ un-
genuine victim constructions highlight varying degrees of victimisation 
and ‘real’ victims stereotypes – the construction of the victim affects 
service provision, policy-making, statistics. ‘Real’ victim definitions 
linked to issues of violence, coercion (and non-coercion) and debt-
bonding; the ‘ideal victim’ being the young female unknowing of her 
fate to work within the sex industry. Requirement to prove status as 
‘innocent victim’.  
 Key issue around agreement to migrate and the consequential effect 
upon whether the act is defined as legal or illegal [or irregular] i.e. if 
there is agreement perceived to be legal migration. Could prove useful 
to explore such constructions  
 Forced labour practices are inherently coercive; In trafficking cases the 
level of coercion is greater 
 Why is the theme of coercion so little understood? Related to ‘real 
options’ 
 The Trafficking framework is fundamentally problematic when used to 
explore forced labour and migration as it fails to reflect exploited, 
migrant and irregular workers’ rights, interests and needs:  
- Are, for example, systems of support for trafficked persons also 
relevant to exploited and forced labour workers? 
- And within different Diasporas? 
- Arguably not – a large group of individuals are prevented from 
accessing the essential services that they require and are, 
therefore, prevented from escaping 
- No ‘real’ options … UNLESS … they cooperate in criminal 
proceedings – but persons are often unwilling due to 
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repercussions; and often because they are expected to be 
repatriated (NB: issues of debt-bonding being carried over after 
repatriation; re-trafficking) 
- Repatriation is problematic as it can fail to take into account 
needs and interests 
 Migrant and forced labour orientated policy needs to guarantee safety to 
work – status and rights, employment tribunals 
 Definitional issues around ‘labour’, ‘migration’, ‘illegality’, ‘forced’ 
and ‘coercion’: ‘forced labour’ and hence definitional issues 
surrounding ‘trafficked for forced labour’; ‘exploited labour’; ‘irregular 
migratory worker’; ‘migrant workers’.  
 Suggestion that people may not feel forced into a situation but on 
investigation they are unable to leave the exploitative situation i.e. 
economics (forced marriages and domestic servitude). Similarly, a 
person may not feel victimised but an infringement of their rights my 
require them to be treated as a victim and accorded the assistance and 
support that they require 
 How the issue is defined and constructed affects research – 
methodological problems – and political and practical understandings 
and policy issues. The manner in which exploited labour is constructed, 
for example, does not have the same media headline pulling appeal as 
trafficking 
 There are no concise profiles of exploited workers; it is difficult to 
distinguish between migrant workers and exploited workers and thus 
there is a compromising of rights and principles 
 Summary: legal migration and exploited labour is a policy ‘grey area’ 
in the UK; those that enter legally and then are exploited during their 
stay are not protected.  
 Further, the law in the UK only stands to criminalize UK-national 
employers guilty of exploitative labour practices, and thus there are a 
group of people in the UK guilty of carrying out such practices but who 
are not getting prosecuted for it 
 
Estonian perspective on forced labour and migration 
 Since 2004 there has been an increase in the movement of Estonians to 
Finland, Ireland and the UK for the purpose of work – linked to the fact 
that the State has restricted the right to work 
 In 2004, there were 1,500- 2,000 Estonian migrant seasonal workers in 
Ireland 
 Poor living conditions compared to the Irish standard but earning 
comparably more than in Estonia 
- Issue of perceptions of victim status, coercion and forced 
labour.  
- Irish trade union outrage at the fact that employers are willing to 
take advantage of a workforce willing to work for lower wages 
than those demanded by the national workforce.  
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- Contentious and somewhat complex discussion around what is 
justified as exploitation – is it linked to one’s own perception? 
Relativity? 
 
Presentation on Labour and Migration by Elinda Niedre, IOM, Estonia 
 Why do we focus on the sexual exploitation of women and children? 
During six years of work with IOM, recalls that there have been no 
cases of men contacting the organisation with regards to exploitation. 
Why? 
- Issues around male dignity, pride  
- Further discussion of the perception of the issue: many workers 
perceive their situation to be a means to an end or a need but not 
necessarily exploitative 
 Need to increase awareness of migrant rights in society and within the 
workplace: 
- Future campaigns are focussing on how males and females can 
avoid being exploited in foreign countries [evidence of the need 
to look beyond sexual exploitation] 
 Issue of the rehabilitation of trafficked persons – even if trafficked 
persons agree to be part of a rehabilitation programme there is an issue 
around the changing modus operandi of the traffickers. Evidence of the 
development of corporate relationships between trafficked persons and 
the traffickers. 
 Estonian service provision for trafficked persons is very limited; There 
is no accepted definition of trafficking and thus prosecutions are 
difficult 
 Need to work towards improved policing and prosecution of the 
problem 
 
Presentation by Ago Tikk, FRONTEX, Finland 
 FRONTEX is EU cooperation at the external borders with the aim of 
strengthening borders 
 EU community body; legal personality; autonomous budget; governed 
by a management board 
 Key player in the implementation of common EU policy for integrated 
border management 
 Three concepts for activity: 
- EU policy for integrated border management 
- Border security strategy 
- EU integrated border management system 
 Cooperation as the key issue 
 Emphasis on assistance to member States with regard to training of 
border guards – models for document checking and document forgery 
 Technical and operational assistance to Member States 
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 Support to Member States in organising joint return operations 
 Risk analyses focusing on illegal immigration at external borders 
 Provision of systematic and updated information 
 Identification of the most appropriate potential locations for the 
positioning of technical control equipment 
 
Presentation by Peeter Palo, Europol, Estonia 
 International police and law enforcement cooperation 
 [Historical discussion- I can fill the gaps if need be?] 
 Aim to assist Member States’ law enforcement agencies in the fight 
against organised crime 
 Europol can only act if at least two Member States are affected 
 Adopts a multi-agency approach 
 Provides: quick exchange of information; investigative support; 
European crime overview; expertise; training; research and 
development; intelligence bulletins; liaison officers 
 Remit of Crimes Against Persons Unit includes: illegal immigration; 
smuggling; trafficking in human beings; sexual exploitation; cross-
border homicide; illicit trade of human organs 
 Lack of analytical support 
 FRONTEX does not have operational systems in source countries 
 
Session Six. Organisation of crime and criminal networks. 
Chairs: Mika Junninen, HEUNI, Finland 
Anna Markina, Institute of Law, University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Presentation of the research 
 In Estonia, organised crime is linked to the facilitated movement of 
persons for prostitution 
 Estonia as a source country to the Nordic countries and a transit country 
(Russia- Estonia- Scandinavia) 
 No particular organised criminal groups were identified in Estonia 
 Facilitation was largely by homogeneous communities for reason of 
kinship (some links with criminal activities) 
 UK: identification of organised crime structures 
 Criminal groups largely involved in the sex industry 
 Evidence of criminal groups largely located in the UK but with contacts 
in countries of origin (e.g. ATM card-reader scam) 
 Organised crime groups operate under the guise of Employment 
Agencies 
 Evidence of both loosely structured organised crime groups and highly 
structured organised crime groups – NETWORKS 
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 The fluidity of markets allows for a multitude of criminal organisations; 
evidence of opportunistic crime groups 
 In the UK, formation is often around family networks: kinship and 
geographical regionalism, ex-pat communities 
 Some evidence of looser connections – internal connections but no 
external connections 
 In Finland organised crime groups use Russians as a means to an end 
but there is no evidence of reliance upon Russian organised crime 
groups by Finns  
 No evidence of Russian serious organised crime groups in Estonia; in 
Estonia, organised crime groups operate in a cell structure – there is no 
hierarchy. Some fluidity and exchange of information depending upon 
the market 
 In Finland and Estonia, organised crime is more often related to drugs 
and freight 
 Hierarchal group linkages – the sex industry is the easiest industry to 
control and hence a situation has arisen wherein criminal groups begin 
working in the sex industry and then move on to other areas 
 
Closing Session. Chair: Jon Spencer, University of Manchester, UK 
 Often presented with a ‘murky’ picture given the clandestine nature of 
illegal immigration and organised crime 
 Organised criminal networks and groups benefit from the exploitation 
of the facilitated (illegal) movement of persons 
 Need to resolve: what is exploitation? Forced labour? 
 There is a need to focus on the victim and the crime, and the manner in 
which the victim is constructed – as this affects the understanding of the 
issue, the response to the issue, and policy developments 
 Discussion of further research opportunities and Framework Seven 
 
 
CLOSE 
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INTRODUCTION  
The project reported here is a three country project, Estonia, Finland and the 
UK. It is funded by the European Commission AGIS Programme, The 
Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security. It investigates the issues of 
corruption by organised crime in relation to border controls and immigration 
using as a case study the Estonian and Russian border, the methods of illegal 
facilitation of people across borders, the role of crime groups and networks as 
well as organised crime and the relationship between illegal facilitation and 
exploitation in the labour market.  
A working hypothesis of the research is that the EU border with Russia is 
‘weak’ and vulnerable to corruption at different levels: systemic, that is that 
corruption is incorporated within the system of immigration and border 
crossing, institutional where the institution is tolerant of corrupt practice and 
individual where the person is prepared to undertake illegal actions because 
their employment provides them with an opportunity to exploit their position 
for gain. So, corruption is used to maintain the flow of people across the border 
illegitimately by utilising existing legitimate channels. The Russian/Estonian 
border will be targeted by organised crime to secure the movement of people 
illegally due, in part, to the accession of Estonia to the EU. The project 
investigates the flow of people illegally from Russia (3rd Country) into Estonia 
(transit country) and how facilitated people are moved onward. Particular 
attention is focused on the possible processes of corruption in relation to 
existing structures. Once a person has reached a transit country the research is 
structured to investigate the progress to a destination country62. A further area 
of the research project is how illegal immigration results in new forms of 
organised crime, by those who have entered illegally, in a destination country 
(see for example Richards 2004). 
There are four key research questions: 
1. How is corruption used to secure the passage of people across 
borders?  
2. Is there evidence that border controls are weak? 
3. How are people moved from one EU member state to another? 
4. What is the impact of illegal forms immigration on crime rates and 
organised crime and criminal groups/networks in destination 
countries?  
The research project is structured to allow for the exchange of knowledge 
between key law enforcement personnel in each of the participating countries. 
In each country there is a Local Network Group comprising of law enforcement 
                                                 
62 A source country is the country of origin of people migrating, a transit country is one that a 
facilitated person moves through, and a destination country is that country to which they wish 
to enter as their final destination. 
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professionals with responsibility for immigration, border control, ‘organised’ 
crime and prosecutions. At two critical points in the research process, the 
interim and final report stage, the Local Network Groups are brought together 
to form a Project Network Group. The Project Network Group is involved in 
the review of the research data and contribute to the analysis of the data. This 
Interim Project Report is in part the product of the Project Network Group that 
met in Tallinn in January 2006. 
There are five areas which have emerged from the research data in the first 
phase; first, corruption and document fraud, second, the illegal crossing of 
borders, third, the identification of key policy issues, fourth, the exploitation of 
people entering the EU illegally and finally the role of organised crime and 
criminal networks. Each of these areas will be discussed in detail in this report. 
The illegal movement of people across borders is not a new phenomenon, there 
has always been a movement of people for a number of reasons. However, as 
the disparities between the developed and developing worlds widen so one 
impetus for migration is that of economics. However, for many the decision to 
migrate without the necessary entry requirements of the country of choice can 
be a hazardous and dangerous decision as the means of entry will be by 
necessity be illegal. Within the European Union (EU) there is an expectation 
that there should be a free movement of people between member states. This is 
to assist in the economic development, free movement of labour and to ensure 
responsive markets responsive to need. However, as recent research has 
indicated the development of markets and of responsive labour markets is not 
an even process and labour markets develop in relation to profitability and the 
regulation of wages (Peck et al 2005) The principle of free movement creates a 
number of anxieties, and for some states such a principle has political 
implications, for member states. The concern is that once a person has 
managed to obtain entry to the EU they have freedom of movement across all 
EU member states virtually unhindered.  
It was such an anxiety caused by this free movement of people that resulted in 
the UK and Ireland not to sign the Schengen Agreement in 1994. For member 
states illegal immigration is a political issue and creates a number of political 
difficulties and a consequence in some EU member states is the impetus the 
issue provides for far right politics. One response to illegal immigration by the 
EU has been to strengthen border security through forms of co-operation and 
the introduction of FRONTEX63 is evidence of such a response. At the same 
time individual countries have introduced more restrictive policies in relation 
to immigration (Anti-Slavery International 2002). 
The number of people being moved is difficult to calculate, however, the 
numbers are thought to be considerable (Woodbridge 2005). The opportunities 
that this presents to criminal networks, crime groups and organised crime is 
                                                 
63 FRONTEX is a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union and was established to improve 
integrated management at the EU's external borders. 
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obvious. Individuals will pay to be moved from a source country to a 
destination country, or for component parts of each journey. The numbers of 
people, the practical difficulty in securing borders and the potential 
opportunities for exploitation of those who are illegally moved are 
considerable. The potential gains from facilitation and trafficking are ones that 
attract all types of criminal enterprise. As Koser (2001) has argued there are 
three key debates, “….the efficacy of asylum policies, the trafficking of asylum 
seekers and their increasing vulnerability” and each of these debates is effected 
by criminal activity and criminal justice policy responses. 
Defining the problem and securing borders 
The number of illegal immigrants in any of the participating countries is 
difficult to quantify. In Estonia there are some obvious measures, for example 
any black or minority ethnic populations would be highly visible in Finnish 
and Estonian society as these are not strongly multi-cultural societies. 
However, this did not rule out that there could be a number of people illegally 
in the country, for example Russians who have entered legally and over stayed 
would not be visible either physically or through language. In the UK with a 
culturally diverse society it is difficult to identify people in the country illegally 
by physical characteristics and lack of English as a language is also not an 
identifying factor. Consequently people who enter the UK illegally are able to 
conceal themselves in a range of communities that are established and living in 
the country legally. 
The lack of any reliable means of estimating the number of people in a country 
legally (Woodbridge 2005) means that other ways of measuring the impact of 
illegal immigration are used. Crime figures may be one useful indicator of the 
provisional size of a country’s illegal immigrant population; for instance how 
many people are arrested for offences who are not in the country legally? 
Victimization statistics would also be a useful measure, although people in a 
country illegally are not likely to report crimes due to their illegal status. Social 
indicators may also be useful in determining if there is a problem, for example 
the number of women who are not a national of the country employed in the 
sex industry, or persons employed in construction work and other sectors 
employing casualised labour. However, this only gives one view on a narrow 
area of activity where there is considerable activity in relation to employment 
in other economic sectors. The case of the Chinese cockle-pickers in the UK 
who died whilst out on a sandbank collecting cockles indicates that there is a 
range of work. In the UK there are no specific statistics or measurements of the 
number of Chinese illegal immigrants in the UK. 
It is apparent that the issue of secure borders is one of definition and 
perception. For example, it can be defined as ‘destination’ country problem as 
it is there that people entering the EU illegally are intending to go to and 
therefore not the problem of the transit country. It might be that destination 
countries have a range of factors that make them ‘more desirable’ destinations 
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than other countries; the presence of established expatriate communities could 
be considered a ‘pull’ factor (Aromaa 1995.)  
Actually defining who is an illegal immigrant is also problematic. A number of 
problems can be identified in relation to the definition of ‘illegal immigrant’. 
First, the status of the immigrant may change over time, so a person may enter 
a country legally but over stay and therefore become an illegal immigrant. The 
legal status also creates confusion in relation to those people who are 
trafficked. Many trafficked people have crossed a border legitimately. It is their 
exploitation which is illegal rather than their residence status. 
The introduction of the Schengen Agreement did not exacerbate the problem of 
illegal immigration. Finland experienced an increase in the number of illegal 
immigrants shortly after joining Schengen; however, this was thought to have 
been the result of those facilitating the movement of people across borders 
testing ‘new’ Schengen border arrangements. For many member states 
Schengen was viewed positively as it provided a unified and common system 
of monitoring border movements that relied on the sharing of information and 
the use of agreed procedures and protocols. This can be seen to provide a much 
greater ability to control border crossing points across the EU as it takes place 
within an agreed and unified structure. 
Whilst the above were viewed as positives there was also recognition that there 
were some negative aspects. Schengen allows for the free movement of people, 
it also allows for the free movement of criminal networks and allows crime 
groups the opportunity to exploit the ability to move freely and establish links 
to extend and broaden their networks. 
Borders are difficult to secure, there are many points of vulnerability and it is 
clear that in many respects border controls are reactive to the new forms of 
strategies used by those wishing to circumvent them. An example of this is the 
establishment of ‘Juxtaposed Controls64’ between the UK and France and the 
UK and Belgium in an attempt to prevent the illegal crossing of the borders 
prior to the border being crossed. There are three key issues in assessing border 
security; first the level of systematic corruption of border guards at the border 
crossing point. It was recognised by all respondents that there were occasions 
when a border guard may well be corrupt or susceptible to bribes but that the 
real test was whether there is any evidence of systematic corruption of border 
guard personnel where the corruption flows from the top of the organisation to 
the bottom. It is also recognised that some borders have particular points of 
vulnerability. These vulnerable points may be at particular times of the day, or 
particular times on particular days, or at the point of shift change. These points 
are not indicators of corruption but are pointers towards vulnerability of 
borders to exploitation of weaknesses by those wishing to facilitate the 
movement of people. 
                                                 
64 Juxtaposed Controls is where UK immigration is located at the French and Belgian Channel 
ports, likewise the French Gendarme have border crossing controls at the major UK channel 
ports. 
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In attempting to assess how secure a border is there are a number of potential 
measures; the number of refusals at a border crossing point as the level of 
refusals is one indicator that border guards are engaged in their work and 
actively attempting to prevent illegal entry. There are also a number of 
potential ways of strengthening borders and one is the employment of extra 
border guards. However, such a strategy does not always result in a reduction 
of the number of people entering a country illegally. Another strategy is to 
increase the use of technological devices to prevent illegal entry, such as the 
heat seeking devices and detectors of movements in freight traffic, that are 
used at a number of ports. However all of this, additional personnel and 
technological devices require a financial commitment from states and has 
policy impacts on how border agencies are structured, for example are certain 
activities contracted out to the private sector?. 
There are other ways to protect and secure borders. Whilst increasing staff and 
technological know-how may lead to a reduction in the number of people 
entering a country illegally it does not address the roots of the problem. A more 
far reaching means of dealing with the problem of illegal immigration is to 
attempt to control the flow and direction of people moving illegally. This is 
probably easier said than done as the movement and migration of people is an 
issue that is linked to the movement of global capital, the restructuring of 
production and the needs of the wider European economy and the economic 
wellbeing of some member states. 
It is not possible to quantify the size of illegal immigration with any degree of 
reliability as the nature of the problem is such that it is hidden and so the 
number of people illegally in any country is a matter of an informed guess. It 
may not be necessary to quantify the problem with exact numbers but using 
other indicators such as levels of criminal involvement, activity in relation to 
prostitution may prove to be ‘good indicators’ of the extent of the problem in 
any one country. It is also acknowledged that not all cases of illegal 
immigration are the result of a person entering a country illegally. Many people 
enter a state legally but remain without permission after their right to residence 
has expired. This is a complicating factor in trying to assess the ‘size of the 
problem’.  
In order to understand the attraction of some states as destination countries it is 
important to analyse the historical traditions and the social composition of the 
destination country. So, a country with a long colonial history may well 
experience illegal immigration from former colonies. Other countries may have 
a record of receiving certain groups and communities and there that country 
becomes a focal point because of the size of its ‘expatriate’ communities. Such 
communities provide places of shelter and also provide a common language 
and a basis of knowing how the new society actually functions. Such expatriate 
communities also usually have links with communities in the country of origin 
and so it makes the arrangement of travel and entry easier. It also adds another 
dimension to the process of facilitation where the motivation may not be 
money alone but also a sense of loyalty to an area, region or town. For many 
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states the issue of illegal immigration is a politically charged one and this has 
an influence on how policy in this area is structured and delivered.  
Illegal immigration is problematic for many states. For some, such as the UK, 
the problem is that the UK is a destination state and with that comes a range of 
subsidiary problems which include possible effects on crime and the structure 
of the sex industry. For other states, such as Finland, it was clear that the 
problem was not one of being a destination country but a series of issues in 
relation to people entering illegally and thus rendering some of the border areas 
vulnerable to corruption and other illegal practices. The global issues were also 
recognised by respondents where the links between economic performance, 
availability of labour and the costs, both human and economic, of illegal 
immigration, were understood. 
The Role and Extent of Corruption 
Corruption is of particular interest because the use of corrupt practices to 
secure the compliance of officials allows criminals an easy passage across 
borders and at the same time legitimates their illegal practices. For example, 
the corruption of a border guard could result in official residence stamps being 
placed in a passport, ignoring false documents or impostors. For those 
attempting to facilitate people illegally across borders corruption is one of the 
key methods used to achieve such ends as it lowers the risk at one of the most 
vulnerable parts of the journey.  
The definition of corruption used in the research is: 
“…many kinds of “irregular” influence, the objective of which is to 
allow the participants to make profits they are not entitled to, the 
method being the breaking of internal or external rules.” 
For some of the respondents this definition would have been more accurate if 
profit was replaced by ‘gain’. The idea that the profit or gain was solely 
individual was also questioned by some respondents who argued that a person 
may make a gain for others through loyalty or family affiliation. The important 
point to note is that many respondents considered that the process of corruption 
might take place at a distance from the port of entry and that it was not a 
simple matter of the offer of a monetary reward, other forms of favourable 
treatment may also act as an inducement to behave in a corrupt fashion. 
There is a need to identify the risk factors in relation to corruption. The level of 
remuneration of border guards is one such indicator, low salaries of border 
guards is a potential weakness and likely to be exploited by criminal groups. 
One strategic means of eliminating the potential risks and weaknesses is by 
identifying the weaknesses and taking action to remedy them where at all 
possible. It is apparent that there are social structural reasons that also 
contribute to corruption being more difficult; for example in Finland there are 
very low levels of corruption among public officials. The reason for such low 
levels of corruption might be that there is a tradition of high moral standards 
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amongst Finnish civil servants and a high level of transparency of state 
institutions and the actions of public officials. In Finland there is a very high 
degree of loyalty to state institutions that requires commensurate levels of 
behaviour. So, it is important to analyse the social context within which 
corruption occurs if an accurate threat assessment can be undertaken. 
This need to understand the social context and how it changes overtime is 
evident in relation to Estonia. The movement of people across the Estonian 
border does not appear to be a significant issue in relation to corruption; 
however, goods and money appear to be the weak points in relation to 
corruption. So, it is commodities that are more profitable than people currently 
within the Estonian context. However, it is also apparent that in certain 
situations people are commodities and therefore this may result in future 
vulnerability for Estonia. The strategy in relation to corruption for all states 
should be the elimination of risk; this requires the identification of weaknesses 
and vulnerable points, an understanding of the social and economic context and 
the need to define potential future threats. 
The research undertaken by all three countries indicates that corruption is not 
systemic or endemic in any of the three countries. There were isolated cases 
and what was described as low level bribery. There are also no indications that 
the findings of this research are inaccurate as a number of officials from 
different agencies confirmed that corruption was not regularized or tolerated. 
The low levels of corruption may also indicate that there are other criminal 
strategies that are used to facilitate entry and that these do not require 
corruption to achieve and also minimize the risk of apprehension and exposure 
of the criminal operation. It is to these strategies that we now turn. 
Moving People Across Borders 
The movement of people across borders is not a new phenomenon. However 
the socio-political and economic context has changed greatly over the past two 
decades. The globalization of markets, production and consumption has 
resulted in the movement of people to meet the new demands for labour in 
developed areas. Consequently there are numerous ways in which people are 
moved across borders. The desire for individual people to move from their 
country of residence where they have legal status to a country where they will 
be considered an illegal immigrant is one that is motivated by a number of 
factors; the desire to improve their economic position, to avoid torture and 
interrogation at the hands of political dictators, to join family in the destination 
country and to access what is seen to be a better and more stable life are just a 
few of the reasons. The journey from the country of origin to the destination 
country can be a dangerous and arduous one and provides many opportunities 
for criminal groups, organised crime and criminal networks to exploit through 
a variety of entrepreneurial activities.  
In order to understand the process of facilitation it is important to recognise 
that there are very many different ways in which a person can be moved across 
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a border but we would define three models of facilitation. First is the 
Organised Facilitation model. A person can purchase in the country of origin a 
total package that they buy from the facilitator [s] a travel package with the 
necessary documentation that will move them from the point of origin to the 
destination country using false documents to allow the individual to travel in 
relative comfort. The journey may be staged and during the waiting periods the 
person being moved will be put up in ‘safe houses’ and moved into the 
destination country on forged documents. This ‘tailor-made’ package is 
expensive and can also take a considerable amount of time, for example the 
journey from China to the UK could take anywhere up to nine or twelve 
months and such journeys rely on a good organisation in order to make the 
journey a successful one and is usually the domain of organised crime groups. 
Second, is the Component Facilitation model. A person buys the journey in 
individual pieces; so the crossing of the border is purchased from a facilitator 
and once over the border it is then up to them to make the necessary contacts in 
order to continue their journey. This again relies on criminal networks rather 
than organised crime and the facilitation usually is in the form of concealment 
in a truck, van or car. The facilitated person arranges and buys each component 
part of the journey, usually completing one part of the journey before 
negotiating and paying for the next component part. This may involve them in 
contact with a number of criminal groups and networks as they make their 
journey. The type of journey that they make can vary from being facilitated in 
the back of a lorry or by a courier taking them across the border. The difference 
is that the facilitation is not organised from the point of departure to the point 
of arrival and is not undertaken by the same organisation. The final model of 
facilitation is what can be termed Opportunistic Facilitation, this relies on the 
individual attempting to make their own way in many circumstances either 
because their resources will not cover the final part of the journey or they have 
not established the contacts to enable them to have an organised facilitation. It 
is this group of people who attempt to gain entry by jumping trucks at the ports 
or by concealing themselves on trains. For many this is a hazardous means of 
gaining entry. So, each of these facilitation models requires different types of 
organisation, from the highly organised to the disorganized, relying on criminal 
groups or networks and in some cases organised crime. The model by 
Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) provides a definition of the different types of 
crime groupings: 
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Fig 1 
 
(Taken from Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004) 
 
The first diagrammatic representation suggests a very closed network, in the 
typology used by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) this is most common in 
relation to the movement of drugs, a tight network protecting the commodity as 
it makes its journey from origin to destination. The second diagram suggests 
gaps between contact with the crime networks or groups and this is similar to 
our model of Component Facilitation. The third diagram shows very little 
contact with crime groups other than at the beginning and the end of the 
journey. This in our view corresponds to our Opportunistic Facilitation model 
where there has to be some initial contact to make the first part of the journey 
and there may be a connection to a crime group or network in the destination 
country. 
In relation to each of the models certain types of criminal activity make the 
process of facilitation easier and less risky. Fraudulent documentation is one 
such criminal activity. Document fraud and forgers up until the expansion of 
the internet were usually group and area-specific. So, an illegal immigrant 
would obtain their fraudulent documents from a forger working in their country 
of origin. However, organised crime by exploiting the internet, has led to 
forgery and fraudulent documents becoming more widespread as they are able 
to exploit the market and business opportunity by supplying documents 
globally. Criminal groups have taken advantage of the global market place and 
are able to provide a service to anyone who is willing to pay. The internet has 
resulted in the purchasing of fraudulent documents to facilitate illegal 
immigration more accessible, more sophisticated, and more widespread. 
Fraudulent documents are also used in relation to the accession states in the 
Baltic region. A person from Ukraine, for example, can enter Lithuania 
relatively easily due to pre-EU border crossing relationships. Once a person has 
crossed into Lithuania they can acquire a forged Lithuanian passport or they 
can act as an impostor on real documents and move freely across the EU. 
Therefore, there is a considerable market in forged and fraudulent documents. 
So, the UK witnesses a significant increase in the number people attempting to 
enter the UK on forged documents, for example there has been a dramatic rise 
in the number of Ukrainian people entering the UK on false documents.  
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In relation to Finland there had been an increase in the use of false documents 
and the methods by which different countries issue identification 
documentation can also result in opportunities for forgery. For example in 
Russia both the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs issue identity 
documents used for travel and so these documents can be easily counterfeited. 
There was some evidence within Estonia that forgery was taking place, 
however, identity theft was the main issue. Another noted feature of the 
Estonian situation was that some people had made false claims for citizenship 
and then obtained a passport once citizenship was granted. The citizenship was 
illegal and yet the passport was a legal document. In the UK there was 
evidence of high quality forgeries of varying nationalities produced using 
advanced technologies and linked to organised crime groups; such documents 
are difficult to detect, requiring highly skilled intelligence officers. The 
organisation of forgery appears to be highly sophisticated with large scale 
forgery factories and highly sophisticated distribution networks. For example 
in Lithuania there was the small-scale independent production of forged Euros. 
A law enforcement operation was conducted against the crime group and the 
operation dismantled, however, knowledge of how to counterfeit documents 
remained and production shifted towards a new market, the counterfeiting of 
passports.  
There is evidence of sophisticated production and distribution networks with 
organised crime groups acting as the main entrepreneurs. However, the internet 
has allowed for the production of forged documents outside of the country of 
origin, so UK passports can be forged in Lithuania for example. However, 
whilst there have been successes by law enforcement agencies in detecting the 
production sites of false documents it is also apparent that forgeries are 
difficult to detect making the job of the border guards more difficult. There is 
also some evidence that documents are re-used and this indicates the 
organisation of facilitation by criminal groups or individuals in cases where the 
documentation is re-used. 
Exploitation & Labour 
The research project is also designed to explore the nature of exploitation, 
especially if there is involvement in criminal activities by those who have been 
facilitated, and what is the nature of this criminal activity. However, it is not 
possible to draw a clear distinction between those who are in a country legally 
and yet are exploited and those who are facilitated or trafficked. The problem 
with a policy that simply focuses on illegal migration is that it does not cover 
the proportion of exploited migrants who arrived legally and yet find 
themselves in highly exploitative work situations. So many people working in 
exploited forms of labour may not be in the country illegally, therefore they 
have rights which are legally protected, and however, such rights can be 
overlooked when the policy focus is simply one that is centred on immigration. 
The need to protect the integrity of state’s immigration systems is an important 
and legitimate interest. However, much policy tends to prioritise combating 
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illegal migration over protecting human rights of exploited workers and 
guaranteeing fundamental labour rights to all workers. 
There is also a focus on coercion in relation to the exploitation of immigrant 
workers. The UN Trafficking protocol includes elements of coercion into the 
definition of trafficking, the use of coercion as a distinguishing element is 
problematic on several levels. First it creates a dichotomy between the 
“genuine and non-genuine” victim of trafficking and/or exploitation. ‘Genuine’ 
victims are seen as deserving of assistance and those defined as ‘non-genuine’ 
do not receive assistance. There is an important question concerning how the 
genuine victim is defined. It appears in the UK that the ‘deserving’ victim is 
young, female, over 18, subjected to forced sexual services, and willing to 
collaborate with the authorities (see for example Kelly 2004). But even within 
that group, the number of the “deserving” victims can be seen as being limited, 
for example in the UK the Poppy Project, for victims of trafficking, has only 
been able to assist 25 women at any given time (see 
http://www.womeninlondon.org.uk/notices/eaves0409.htm). However, not all 
trafficked women are forced to work in the sex industry and some are in 
domestic servitude as well as other forms of highly casualised and poorly 
remunerated labour, however, there is also a policy tension where one type of 
forced labour is seen to be more deserving than another. 
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SOME INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The first conclusion is that the overall response to illegal immigration is in the 
member states studied a law enforcement one, or one that relies on criminal 
justice strategies to prevent illegal immigration. Every state has strategies to 
combat illegal immigration; for some countries this is a greater problem than 
for others. The UK is a destination country and so it finds itself the subject of 
many attempts by people to enter illegally. It is also an issue of considerable 
political complexity and so there are a number of co-ordinated strategic 
interventions, for example a dedicated office within the Crown Prosecution 
Service to focus on immigration crime and the setting up by the Home Office 
of REFLEX. These are dedicated teams under the operational direction of 
Chief Constables within police areas. REFLEX teams may be partnership 
based bringing together criminal justice professionals from across different 
criminal justice areas, for example immigration and police. The teams may 
have an operational function or they may be a means of co-ordinating 
intelligence to inform joint Police and Immigration Service operations in that 
area.  
The REFLEX approach in the UK has been thought to be relatively successful 
as it has made the terrain on which organised crime operates more hostile. 
REFLEX can also exploit the network of overseas liaison officers to share 
intelligence and co-ordinate operations. The establishment of EUROPOL is 
one of the ways in which countries share intelligence and undertake joint 
operations. There is some evidence that EUROPOL has been a successful 
agency in the countering of illegal immigration with shared operations and the 
apprehension of organised crime members involved in facilitation. The setting 
up of FRONTEX indicates a development in the EU strategy to protect borders 
by collaboration with external countries. However, REFLEX, EUROPOL and 
FRONTEX are all criminal based strategies using law enforcement and 
criminal sanction as a means to combat illegal immigration. 
The second conclusion is that there are many different forms of crime groups 
operating in the illegal immigration market. These can be characterised as 
Organised Facilitation, Component Facilitation and Opportunistic Facilitation 
and they conform broadly to the organisational structure as defined by 
Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004). It is important in addressing issues of illegal 
immigration to understand the arenas in which these different crime groups 
operate, as they do not appear to operate across all types of illegal immigration 
activity. Thirdly, there does not appear to be any form of systemic corruption 
in the states that form the basis of our research. There were examples of 
individual cases but none of systematic and organised corruption of public 
officials that would fall within our definition. Fourthly, there is a large and 
active market in the supply of forged documents. It is here that the 
organisational requirements of organised crime groups are evident. Fifthly, 
there is a need to understand the social, economic and political context of each 
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country. For example, there has been a long tradition of immigration to the UK 
and so there are many expatriate communities. The UK has a long colonial 
history and this contributes to the focus of the UK as a destination country. 
Consequently, it is apparent that the movement of people is not random and 
that the choice of destination country is based on historical associations and 
connections made with family and friends. 
The world of illegal immigration is obscured by the clandestine nature of the 
activity. This makes undertaking research difficult as there is plenty of law 
enforcement personnel to interview but those involved in illegal immigration in 
relation to either the facilitator or the facilitated are difficult to find. In relation 
to the person who crosses a border illegally they are a conundrum for many 
criminal justice agencies as they are both the offender and the victim at the 
same time. There is no clear demarcation between the offender and the victim 
and this makes for uneasy policy making and implementation and partly 
explains the official criminal justice responses to those who are moved 
illegally. It is hoped that the next phase of this research will shed some light on 
this murkier world. 
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